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NOTE
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF PRICES: A STUDY OF
MILK CONTROL IN PENNSYLVANIA
I. INTRODUCTION

In the decade following World War I, the dairy industry enjoyed an
era of prosperity; strong foreign and domestic demands supported heavy
production and adequate prices. With the onset of the depression, however, widespread unemployment and reduced incomes severely eroded
much of this demand while production and supply continued at relatively
constant levels.' The usual result of such economic imbalance ensued:
dairy prices were forced into a gradual and continuing decline.2 Vicious
price wars accompanied and contributed to the downward spiral.3 The
man in the middle-the distributor-naturally attempted to shift the effects
to the producer, and the prevailing economic conditions and characteristics
of the industry made this a relatively simple task. The dairies in a particular region were the principal outlet for nearby independent producers.
The high cost of transporting fluid milk and the perishability of the product
* This Note is the result of a study made possible by funds provided by the
Institute of Legal Research of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for a
research project undertaken by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and kind cooperation of W. T.
Butz, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, Pennsylvania State University;
John B. Martin, Attorney for the Philadelphia Milk Dealers' Association; Harold E.
Kohn and Aaron M. Fine Attorneys for Country Maid Dairies, Inc.; Robert J.
Harbison, III, President of Harbison Dairies, Inc.; James F. Hutton, Executive
Vice President, and Lee F. Driscoll, Jr., General Counsel, of the Slater System Co.;
and the following persons associated with the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission:
Joab K. Mahood, Chairman; Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney; and John S. Pfautz,
Director of Research. The author also acknowledges the assistance of Edward A.
Medman, Class of 1961, University of Pennsylvania Law School, in the conduct of
interviews and in the examination of the commission reports.
1 Production not only failed to respond to the decreasing demand but actually
increased during the depression. The number of cows kept for milk increased from
22,330,000 on January 1, 1929, to 26,062,000 on January 1, 1934. BLACK, THE DAIRY
INDUSTRY AND THE AAA 60 (1935). The canned and condensed milk industry received
its impetus in supplying the sharp increase in foreign demand during World War I.
See Cadwallader, Government and Its Relationship to Price Standards in the Milk
Industry, 22 MINN. L. Rxv. 789, 791-93 (1933). See generally HOLLINGSHEAD &
WILLIAMSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CONCENTRATED MILx (U.S. Dep't of Commerce Trade Promotion Series No. 57, 1928).
2 CASSES, A STUDY OF FLUID MILK PRICES 180-81 (1937).
3 See Steele's discussion following Corbett, Milk Control Experience-Results
and Problems of Federal and State Regulation, 17 J. FAms EcoN. 109 (1935), in id.
at 121-22.
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eliminated more distant buyers from the narrowly drawn boundaries of the
farmer's market. With the unfavorable economic climate of weak demand
combined with large surplus, it is not difficult to see that the farmer had
little choice but to accept the price dictated by the available dairy. The
alternative was spoilage of his entire production. 4
Fearful that meager returns to the producer would result in the elimination of costly sanitary practices and the abandonment of many farmsboth of which threatened the adequacy of a wholesome milk supply,5
Pennsylvania joined many other states 6 in enacting remedial legislation:
an emergency one-year milk control statute was passed in 1934.7 After one
extension,8 the law was reenacted in permanent form in 1937.9 It is this
law, with supplementary amendments, which is implemented today by the
Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission 10 in regulating the industry "for
the protection of the public health and welfare and for the prevention of
fraud." 1
4 For a more detailed account of the economic events leading to the enactment
of milk control laws, see Comment, 42 YALE L.J. 1259 (1933). Some farmers
destroyed their production of milk rather than succumb to the price dictates of the
dairies. Interview With James F. Hutton, Executive Vice President, and Lee F.
Driscoll, Jr., General Counsel, both of the Slater System Co., in Philadelphia, Pa.,
June 15, 1960. See Comment, =pra at 1264 & n.28.
5 Historical Note, following PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-101 (1958) (preamble
to milk control act).
6 Twenty-three states and the federal government enacted milk control laws
during the depression. See Note, 14 N.Y.U.L. REv. 375 (1937).
7 Pa. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, act 37, §§ 1-26.
8 Pa. Laws 1935, act 43, §§ 1-26.
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 700j-101 to -1302 (1958), as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 31, §§ 700j-402, -601 (Supp. 1959) [hereinafter cited as MILK CONTROL LAW].
10 Section 700j-201 of the Milk Control Law provides that the Commission shall
consist of three members, to be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the senate. Each commissioner is to serve for six years and "until
their successors shall have been appointed and qualified." Although § 700j-202 states
that the salary of the chairman shall be $7,250 and that of the members $6,750, the
salaries are currently $10,500 and $10,000, respectively; the disparity between statutory
and actual figures is caused by the fact that commission members are entitled to
salary increases enacted by the general assembly. Snyder v. Barber, 64 Dauph. Co.
Rep. 235 (C.P. 1953). At present, there are only two members on the Commission,
Chairman Joab K. Mahood and Simon K. Uhl. Although Chairman Mahood's term
has expired, he continues to serve since senate Republicans who wished to retain him
last year refused to confirm the governor's selections. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette &
Sun-Telegraph, June 5, 1960, p. 1, col. 1. After the senate adjourned sine die, the
governor reappointed his original choices and stated that they could take office
immediately; Chairman Mahood, however, contends that the governor's choice to
replace him cannot claim the post until his nomination is confirmed by the senate.
Chairman Mahood's challenge of the appointment may be short-lived, for the newly
elected senate is likely to confirm the governor's selections. The Evening Bulletin
(Philadelphia), Nov. 15, 1960, p. 3, col. 5.
11MILK CONTROL LAW § 7001-101. The Commission is empowered with the
general power to supervise, investigate, and regulate the entire milk industry of
Pennsylvania and can also establish reasonable trade practices. MILK CONTROL LAW

§ 700j-301. Finances for milk control in Pennsylvania come mainly from legislative

appropriations and license fees. SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, MILK CONTROL PROGRAMrS
OF THE NORTHEASTERN STATES pt 2, at 27 (Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. 918, 1955). The largest license fee assessed has been $20,000 per
year. Id. at 35.
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All milk dealers and handlers 1 2 who purchase a substantial volume of
milk or who sell in a market 13 having a population over 1,000 are required
by statute to obtain licenses from the agency.' 4 However, automatic exemption from the licensing requirement is granted to retail stores purchasing milk from licensed dealers, 15 and the Commission is given power
to exempt all such stores. 16 In practice, this discretionary power has little
17
use, for nearly all retail stores acquire their milk from licensed dealers.
The Milk Control Commission is empowered to refuse, suspend, or
revoke a license if the applicant or licensee has committed any one of certain acts specified in the statute.' 8 The Commission also enforces the
12 A "milk dealer" or "handler" is defined as "any person, including any store
or subdealer or subbandler . . . who purchases or receives or handles on consignment
or otherwise milk within the Commonwealth, for sale, shipment, storage, processing
or manufacture, within or without the Commonwealth, whether on behalf of himself
or others, or both. A producer who delivers milk to a milk dealer or handler only
shall not be deemed a milk dealer or handler." MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-103.
13
"'Market' includes any county, city, borough, incorporated town, or township
in the Commonwealth, or any two or more such counties, cities, boroughs, incorporated
towns, or townships, or any portions thereof, or any other land within the territorial
limits of the Commonwealth designated by the commission as a marketing area."
MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-103.
14
MILK CONTROL LAW §§ 700j-401, -402. In addition to the retail store exemption, see notes 15-16 infra and accompanying text, certain other persons are excused
from this requirement. Section 700j-402 states that the "commission may...
exempt from the license requirements . . . milk dealers or handlers who purchase
or handle milk in a total quantity not exceeding one thousand five hundred pounds
in any month, and milk dealers or handlers selling milk in any quantity only in markets
of a population of one thousand, or less, for local consumption. The commission may,
by official order, exempt stores, or any class thereof, from the license requirements
provided by this act, and shall exempt stores selling milk all of which has been
purchased or acquired from a licensed milk dealer or handler." However, those milk
dealers exempted are still subject to all other provisions of the act, except that "in
cash sales of milk, to consumers in containers owned and provided by the consumer,
if he shall have produced all the milk on the farm where sold and such milk has
at no time left the producer's farm prior to its sale to the consumer and he shall
have neither purchased nor received milk from other producers or handlers and his
total sales to consumers do not exceed two gallons to any one consumer in any one
day, the producer so selling milk shall be exempt from the provisions of this act."
MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-402. There is little difficulty in obtaining a license from
the Milk Control Commission-the requirements of § 700j-403 are not rigorous. Contrast the practice under the milk control laws of New York and Virginia, where
licensing is restrictive in order to limit the number of dealers and the duplication of
marketing facilities. SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, Op. Cit. supra note 11, at 34-35.
15 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-402.

16 Ibid.

17 SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 35.
18 The Commission can refuse to grant a license to an applicant or, upon sufficient

notice and after a hearing, suspend, revoke, or refuse to reissue a license if a dealer
(1) has rejected, without reasonable cause, any milk purchased or acquired from a
producer; (2) has failed to account and make payment for milk purchased from a
producer; (3) has committed an act injurious to the public health or public welfare;
(4) has made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; (5) has been a
party to a combination to fix prices in violation of law; (6) has failed to keep records
or furnish accurate statements required by the Commission; (7) has violated any
provision of the act or any rules, regulations, or orders of the Commission. MILK
CONTROL LAW § 700j-404. Licensees and others not required to be licensed may also
be cited for violation of other sections of the act. See MILK CONTROL LAW §§ 700j-807,
-1001, -1002. For a discussion of the use of these sanctions to enforce minimum prices,
see notes 326-54 infra and accompanying text.
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legislative directive that all dealers who acquire milk from Pennsylvania
producers be bonded. 19 The bonding procedure is designed to protect the
farmers from unscrupulous dealers and is necessitated by the "utilization"
method"2 of compensating producers, under which payment is impossible
until two or three weeks after the dealer receives the milk. Bonding has
been effective in Pennsylvania as a means of insuring payment and is
recognized as one of the more important milk control functions.21 In
addition, the Commission has authority to control trade practices in the
dairy industry,2 to issue weighing permits, 23 to certify and check testers
and scales used in measuring milk quality and quantity,2 4 and to require
26
25
dealers to keep records- and file reports.
One of the most important and controversial of the Commission's
economic regulatory powers is that of fixing minimum milk prices at the
producer, dealer, and retailer levels. 27 It is the purpose of this Note to
determine the present value and operation of this economic control and to
examine the role of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission in adminisStering its program of price regulation.
19 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-501. Pennsylvania also requires subdealers to file
bonds before buying or receiving milk from dealers. MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-513.
20
In Pennsylvania milk is classified according to the use to which it is put. A
higher price is paid for milk used for fluid consumption than for that used in making
ice cream, cheese, and so on. After the dealer determines his "utilization," he pays
his producers according to a "blended price"-meaning that all of his producers
receive the same price per weight unit with small additions or subtractions depending
upon the amount of butter fat contained in the individual farmer's original shipment.
The "blend" or average price is computed by determining the total value of the milk
utilized in each classification, adding together the totals of the various classifications,
and then dividing by the total pounds of milk received from all producers. Thus, if
the Class I price of milk were $5.00 per unit, Class II $4.00 per unit, and Class III
$3.50 per unit, and the dealer received 100 units of milk utilizing 50 units in Class I,
30 units in Class II, and 20 units in Class III, the "blend" price would be 50 X $5.00
($250.00), plus 30 X $4.00 ($120.00), plus 20 X $3.50 ($70.00)--or a total of $440.00
-- divided by 100 units, equalling $4.40 per unit. Each farmer would receive $4.40
for each unit supplied by him. See Note, 14 N.Y.U.L. REv. 375, 381 n.62 (1937).
See also Coho, Milk Price Control-A Developing Field of Administrative Law, 45
DICK. L. Rxv. 254, 262-63 (1941) ; Hanna, Cooperative Milk Marketing and Restraint
of Trade, 23 Ky. L.J. 217, 245-47 (1935) ; Note, The "Rate Base" in Milk Control,
45 DICK. L. Rr v. 135, 142 (1941).
21
Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control
Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960.
22 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-301.
23 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-601.
24 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-602. Inasmuch as it is the dealer's responsibility
to weigh milk received and to test it for butter fat content, it is apparent that a dealer
could easily defraud his producers by maintaining defective scales or testers. There-

fore, the Commission is authorized to certify equipment to be used and to check the
dealer's tests. Certification takes place at least once a year at each plant. SPENCER &
CHRSTRNSEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 47.
2 5

MILK CONTROL

26 MILK CONTROL

LAW § 7001-701.
LAW § 700j-702.
LAW § 700j-802, -803.

Minimum price fixing is mandatory;
27 MILK CONTROL
the Commission also has discretionary power to fix maximum wholesale and retail
I
prices but has never done so. See MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-802.
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II. PRESENT ECONOMIC VALIDITY OF MILK CONTROL
Are the economic judgments incorporated into the Milk Control Law
valid today? Does the farmer still need price fixing to survive? Is he
surviving under economic control? Has minimum pricing at the secondary
and tertiary levels of distribution been effective in promoting the legislative
goal of a decent producer profit and reasonable consumer prices? Has it
tended to favor the interests of the distributors? Obviously, these are
questions of a legislative character, but inasmuch as twenty-five years have
elapsed since the law was enacted, an intense reexamination of milk control,
similar to that conducted by the New York legislature in 1937,28 would not
be out of place. This would accord with the United States Supreme Court's
view of "legislation at its fairest: frequent reconsideration, intensive study
of the consequences of what has been done, readjustment to changing conditions, and safeguarding the future on the basis of responsible forecasts." In New York, it was discovered that dealers were evading price controls by means of out-of-state purchases and by forcing-through threats
to discontinue business-in-state farmers to accept payments below the
minimum.30 This added margin enabled the dairies to give secret discounts
at the wholesale level. Since the retail prices were followed, much of the
benefit of price fixing accrued to restaurants and stores, rather than to
producers and consumers. After an ineffectual period of strict enforcement, the legislature allowed the price-fixing provisions of the law to expire
and enacted a permissive system of regulated prices applicable only on the
producer level. 3 ' While the New York and Pennsylvania situations were
thought so similar in 1933 32 that legislators in the latter state passed pricing legislation identical in essential respects to the original New York
law,33 the review and revision described above has had no effect upon Pennsylvania milk control, even though the present evils and ineffectiveness
of the regulatory mechanism closely parallel those existing in New York
in 1937. A number of dairies import milk at prices below the minimum,3 4
28See SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, MILK CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE NORTHEASTERN STATES pt. 1, at 98 (Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station
Bull. 908, 1954); REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE
MILK
2 9 INDUSTRY, N.Y. LEGIs. Doc. No. 81 (1937).
East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234-35 (1945).
The
Supreme Court commended the New York legislature for following a course of
moratorium legislation characterized as an "empiric process of legislation at its
fairest . . . ." Id. at 234. In Pennsylvania the probability of reconsideration
appears slight, in view of the strong representation of the dealers and producers in
Harrisburg, the unwillingness of both political parties to lose rural votes, and the
lack of knowledge and interest in milk control on the part of the consumers. See
PA. ST. UNIv. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURAL ECON. AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY, JOURNAL SERIES
PAPER No. 1807, CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION OF STATE MILK CONTROL IN
PENNSYLVANIA
30

(1953).

SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 17-18.

31
32 N.Y.

AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 252-58n.
Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 272, 186 Atl. 336, 343 (1936).
33 Id. at 258, 186 At. at 343.
3

4 Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960; see Business Review, April
1955, pp. 12-13.
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and violation of the pricing features of the statute is apparently undeterred
35
by the Commission's present enforcement program.
A. ProducerPrices
The principal argument currently made for minimum price fixing at
the producer level is similar to that advanced when the act was first passed:
36
producer prices cannot be set satisfactorily by the forces of competition.
It is contended that the meager prices of an uncontrolled market would
cause the farmer to abdicate his responsibility of producing wholesome milk
in sufficient quantity. 37 The continued vitality of the argument is doubtful
on two grounds. First, open competition may not be so detrimental to the
producer as is predicted. There is evidence that in Ohio, where milk prices
are unregulated by the state,38 the farmer is doing better economically than
his Pennsylvania counterpart. In April 1960 the "blend" price received by
Youngstown, Ohio, farmers was $4.32 per hundredweight, while dealers
were paying producers in the Pittsburgh area $4.10.39 Even in returns
from the sale of class I milk, for which the Pennsylvania farmer obtains a
higher price than does the Ohioan,." the Ohio producer recovers a larger
share of the consumer dollar. A 1959 survey, conducted in seven cities in
each state found that 54.4 per cent of the retail price went to the Ohio producer, as compared to 51.8 per cent in Pennsylvania.41
Second, there is evidence that the inability of many producers to make
ends meet is an ailment incurable by the minimum pricing formula. Only
if prices are pegged at a level which assures a profit to the least efficient
producer will all farmers be protected. Thus, even with price protection,
the smaller producers often find costs difficult to cover; 42 the expensive
equipment necessary for economical production is frequently not within
the financial means of such farmers. 43 The inevitable result is that the
marginal operator gravitates to other work, and the larger, fully mechanized
3

5See notes 326-54 infra and accompanying text.

36 See notes 5-7 stpra and accompanying text. For a more detailed elaboration
of the argument, see SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 22 n.28.
37 See Historical Note, following PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-101 (1958).

38
Bartlett, Trade Barriers in Milk Distribution, Feb. 2, 1960, p. 4 (paper presented at the dairy marketing session of the Agricultural Industries Forum, University
of Illinois).
39 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette & Sun-Telegraph, June 6, 1960, p. 1, col. 1.

40 Ibid.
41

Bartlett, mtpra note 38, at 5. The seven Ohio cities did have federal regulation
of producer
prices only.
42
Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 17, 1960.
43
"Gravitating to other work" is more easily written than done, especially in the
economically depressed areas of Pennsylvania. A wide range of considerations, other
than obtaining the most efficient allocation of resources in the dairy industry, makes
the choice between keeping the unneeded farmer down on the farm and absorbing
him elsewhere an extremely complex one and one which lies beyond the scope of
this Note. It is merely pointed out here that if the decision be made in favor of
retaining the small farmer, producer price controls do not seem to be capable of
achieving the end.
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producers, together with those farms vertically integrated with the dairies,
take over the job of providing the requisite milk supply.4 4 The vanishing
dairy farmer is one of the predicted by-products of a competitive system,
and yet the same phenomenon appears to occur under regulation also. This
is but further evidence that the farm problem cannot be solved by retention
of the agricultural economy of a century ago. Evolution is creating a new
type of farmer-the large corporate enterprise-and the process is not
stopped by price control. These circumstances indicate that controlled
prices at the farmer level may not be a panacea for the milk producers' ills;
they also indicate that free competition is by no means certain to increase
the gravity of those ills.
Conditions prevailing in Ohio provide reasonable assurance that, at
least in normal times, the efficient producer will receive an adequate return
under more competitive conditions. However, if permanent controls were
eliminated, emergency controls might be retained to guard against producer
difficulties in times which are somewhat less than normal.45 If the drastic
change represented by introducing a system of free competition with
emergency checks is unfeasible, price control only upon approval of twothirds of the farmers in a designated area 46 may be an acceptable middle
ground. This plan offers a flexibility which cannot be achieved under
mandatory price regulation.
B. Secondary Prices
The dairies, the most strenuous advocates of resale pricing,47 paint a
bleak picture of the situation which would exist in the milk industry if
wholesale and retail price regulation were eliminated. Price wars, it is
said, would be rampant.4 8 The farmer would suffer even if producer prices
continued to be set by the Commission; he would not be paid by some
dairies, caught up in the competitive squeeze and eventually forced out of
business; he would lose buyers to the producers of cheaper out-of-state
milk.49 The public, too, would suffer by being exposed to the danger of
unwholesome milk, produced by local and foreign farmers whose production conditions may not be the most sanitary. 50 The dairies' fears, however,
44
Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 17, 1960.
45 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW § 258-m.
46 Ibid.
4
7 This appears to be the general attitude of milk dealers interviewed and to whom
questionnaires
were sent.
48
See, e.g., Interview With John B. Martin, Counsel for the Philadelphia Milk
Dealers Association, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 7, 1960.
49
Interview With Robert J. Harbison, III, President of Harbison Dairies, Inc.,
in Philadelphia, Pa., June 23, 1960. Importation seems to be increasing even with
resale price regulation. In 1952, 92,262,000 pounds of Class I milk were imported
from Ohio as compared to 109,534,000 in 1958. See Pittsburgh Post-Gazette & SunTelegraph, June 6, 1960, p. 1, col. 1.
5o Interview With Robert J. Harbison, III, President of Harbison Dairies, Inc.,
in Philadelphia, Pa., June 23, 1960.
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do not seem well founded. Is not the farmer protected to some extent
against the business failure of his buyers by the bonding and surety provisions of the statute? 51 If it were advantageous to shop out-of-state for
2
milk, would the dairy not be doing so now in order to maximize profits? 1
The obvious answers to these questions, coupled with the evidence from
Ohio, indicate that most of the producers currently operating in the black
would continue to survive if secondary controls were eliminated.5 3 And
the allegation that removal of economic controls would be adverse to the
consumer interest because of the potential impurity of the supply is similarly
unjustified. Sanitary standards could be adequately maintained by other
provisions of existing legislation directed explicitly at assuring a milk
supply which is free from unwholesome elements. 54 Furthermore, unless
price wars were carried to the extreme of leaving one or two dealers in a
position to dominate the market, it is clear that nonregulation would benefit
the consumer in the form of lower prices. In Cleveland, where competition has been termed "intense," the lowest price of a quart of milk in 1959
was slightly above sixteen cents; in Pittsburgh, approximately 130 miles
away, the lowest price was about twenty-five cents a quart. 55 The distributors' gross margin in the Ohio city was about seven cents per quart, as
contrasted to the Pittsburgh margin of over eleven and one-half cents. 56
It is reasonably certain that the concern of the middleman over returning
to a competitive system is primarily one of self-interest and not of anxiety
over the fate of the producer or consumer.
Although it is likely that prices would drop if control of secondary
prices were eliminated, it certainly does not follow that they would fall
to the below-cost level often accompanying a full-scale destructive price
war. Experience indicates that below-cost battles are not inevitable;
such activity has not occurred in the seventeen states which have repealed
resale price control legislation. 57 But even if it be assumed that potentially
destructive price wars would occur upon the elimination of secondary
controls, means other than minimum price fixing could be specifically di51 See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.

52

However, some dairies are willing to forego the widest possible profit margin
in order to obtain other benefits from their supplier-farmers. Interview With Robert
J. Harbison, III, President of Harbison Dairies, Inc., in Philadelphia, Pa., June 23,
1960. Many of these dairies pay the Pennsylvania Class I price to foreign producers.
See Pittsburgh Post-Gazette & Sun-Telegraph, June 6, 1960, p. 1, col. 1.
W See Bartlett, supra note 38, at 4-8.
54
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 521-683 (1958), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.

fit. 31, §§ 645-63 (Supp. 1959). Similar protective legislation may be found in the
states bordering Pennsylvania. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, §§ 3101-50 (1953), as
amended, DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 3, §3109 (Supp. 1958); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§§ 569-97, art. 66C, §§ 440-50 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:10-38 to -51, -53 (1940),
as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:10-42, -50 (Supp. 1960) ; N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTs.
LAw §§ 46-58; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3717.01-.13 (Page 1954); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2035-38(13) (1955), as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2037 (Supp. 1960).
5 Bartlett, supra note 38, at 6.
5

6 Ibid.
See Davidson, Milk 120 A Quart-Why Not in Your Tozw?, Collier's, April

57

29, 1955, p. 44.
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rected toward preventing such occurrences. For example, the Commission might be empowered to prohibit sales of milk below cost upon a
showing that the practice was endangering the continued supply of wholesome milk.5 8 A minor variant of such a program would require that
dealers periodically submit lists of prices to be charged by them during
a fixed future period; 59 this method would give the agency sufficient time
to investigate and stop excessive price-cutting before it begins.
Another justification urged for maintaining resale price fixing is that
its elimination would drive the store price of milk to such a low level that
door-to-door service would no longer be economically feasible.60 Some
dairies argue that this service must be continued because it increases consumption of milk.6 The housewife, it is contended, may be deterred from
store purchases by the bulkiness of the product or inclement weather,
problems which she does not have to face with home delivery.6 2 Store
owners respond that their sales would increase if wholesale prices were
lowered to a greater extent than consumer prices;

6

this greater margin,

they say, would enable them to utilize displays and other means of sight
buying in an effort to increase distribution.4
It may well be that home deliveries would suffer with a return to
nonregulation. The Ohio-Pennsylvania comparison shows that store sales
predominate in the competitive Ohio market, while door-to-door deliveries
are the primary means of distribution in Pennsylvania.6 5 Any change in
buying habits would most probably be traceable to the consumer's search
58

1n Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940), the supreme court
held that the 'Fair Sales Act," which prohibited the sale of any merchandise below
cost, was unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds. The "sweeping prohibition"' was found to have no reasonable relation to the protection of the public
welfare. However, the opinion makes it clear that the below-cost controls proposed
here would pass the constitutional test: "If the Act confined itself to prohibiting
sales below cost when intended to destroy competition, it would undoubtedly be
valid . . . . " Id. at 461, 13 A.2d at 70. For the present modified version of the
act, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 211-17 (1960). See also 58 MicE. L. REv. 905
(196).
59 See SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, Op. Cit. supra note 28, at 118-19, which discusses
New Jersey's limited success using this plan.
60
Interview With Director of Field Services for a Philadelphia Dairy, in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960.
61 Ibid.
6
2 Ibid.
63
Interviews With Store Owners in the Philadelphia Area, July-August 1960.
See Questionnaires distributed by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, JuneAugust 1960.
64 Ibid.
65 Bartlett, supra note 38, at 4. In New York after the elimination of resale
price fixing, door-to-door service decreased until now only about ten per cent of
sales are made on this basis, as compared to eighty-five per cent in Philadelphia.
Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960. On the other hand, Baltimore, which
also has no resale price fixing, has about the same percentage of sales by home delivery
as does Philadelphia. Interview With Robert J. Harbison, III, President of Harbison
Dairies, Inc., in Philadelphia, Pa., June 23, 1960.
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for the lowest price. 66 It is doubtful that the consumption of milk-a
necessary food-would fall off if home delivery were discontinued. 67 On
the contrary, one could at least expect that lower prices would cancel out
the inconvenience of store buying.
It is likely that the preservation of home delivery is a goal attributed
to milk control only by those who have substantial interests in this type
of distribution. 68 The dairies, for example, have a large capital investment
in delivery equipment; the truck and tire suppliers derive substantial business from home delivery; and the delivery truck drivers owe their jobs
directly to door-to-door service. All these groups would tend to favor the
retention of controlled prices if it were a means of saving home delivery.
One further aspect of Pennsylvania price control deserves mention
in a discussion of the value of regulation. The Milk Commission has
authority to issue rules of trade practices,O and the violation section of the
statute, in addition to outlawing bald underselling, prohibits the use of
devices aimed at evading the established minimum price."
There is no
doubt that such evasive schemes would provide an easy method of escaping
the price controls; thus their prohibition is a necessary component of effective regulation. But the pervasive ban against "free service, trading stamps,
advertising allowances, or extension of credit" 71 also comprehends much
activity commonly designated as nonprice competition. This necessary
regimentation of the industry is a factor which must be considered in evaluating the merits of the present system as compared to a system of free
competition.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS

A. Due Process Constitutionality
The first serious challenge to the constitutionality of the price-setting
provisions of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Act occurred in Rohrer v.
Milk Control Bd.,72 where the 1934 emergency act was attacked under both
federal and state constitutions. The Pennsylvania high court considered
the federal due process argument foreclosed by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Nebbid v. New York,73 where the Court, finding that
66 See the comparison of retail prices in Ohio (a nonregulated state) with those
of Pennsylvania (a regulated state), in Bartlett, supra note 38, at 4-6.
67 See SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 98.

68 Interview With James F. Hutton, Executive Vice President, and Lee F.
Driscoll, Jr., General Counsel, both of the Slater System Co., in Philadelphia, Pa.,
June 15, 1960.
69
MLK CONTROL LAw § 700j-301.
70
ILK CONTROL LAv § 700j-807.
71 Ibid.
72
322 Pa. 257, 186 Atl. 336 (1936).
73291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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economic regulation of the milk industry was reasonably related to the
promotion of the public welfare,74 sustained the retail price-fixing provisions of the New York milk control statute. 75 Since the Pennsylvania and
New York statutes were virtually identical, 76 Nebbia was viewed as dispelling any possibility that the Pennsylvania act was violative of the fourteenth amendment.77 A Nebbia-type analysis 78 similarly disposed of an
independent challenge under the state due process clause. 79 When the
legislation was reenacted in permanent form, it was again upheld: Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n 80 answered the reiterated constitutional questions with no more than a short reference to
81
Rohrer.
In the years following these decisions, the concept of economic sub82
stantive due process has lost nearly all of its vitality at the federal level.
But many state courts have been unwilling to follow the Supreme Court in
74 On this point, Nebbia was unquestionably a departure from the earlier test
of permissible state regulation of business. See Duane, Government Regulation of
Pricesin Competitive Business, 10 TEmp. L.Q. 262 (1936). Until 1933 regulation was
permissible only if the business was "affected with a public interest'-i.e., was of such
a character that it might be assumed that it had been devoted to a public use, such
as a public utility or a monopoly. See Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket
Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 432 (1927). A number of "private" businesses
were tested under this standard in cases following Tyson; invariably they were found
not to be affected with a public interest sufficiently to allow state regulation of industry prices. See Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (fixing prices of
gasoline) ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (fixing fees charged by employment agents) ; Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (punishing
discrimination in purchasing of milk). The Nebbia Court, however, abandoned the
strict standard of Tyson, 291 U.S. at 536, and held that a business essentially private
in character could be controlled by a state if there was adequate reason to regulate
it in the interest of the public welfare and if the statute had a reasonable relation to
the legislative purpose. Id. at 537.
75 N.Y. Laws 1933, ch. 158 (now N.Y. AaRIc. & MxTS. LAw §§ 252-58n).
76 Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 258, 186 At. 336, 337 (1936).
Depressed economic conditions were also prevalent in both states. Id. at 272, 186 At.
at 343.
77 322 Pa. at 258, 186 Att. at 337.
78 See 322 Pa. at 266-72, 186 Atl. at 340-43.
79 PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9.
80 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775 (1938).
81332 Pa. at 20, 1 A.2d at 778. For other state court decisions holding constitutional the milk control laws of their jurisdictions, see Franklin v. State ex rel.
Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 232 Ala. 637, 169 So. 295 (1936); Jersey Maid
Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939); Shiver v. Lee, 89
So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1956); Albert v. Milk Control Bd., 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688
(1936); Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112
So. 2d 606 (1959); Milk Marketing Bd. v. Johnson, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346
(1940); Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 190 Atl. 713 (1937); State ex reL.
State Bd. of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 179 Atl. 116
(Ct. Err. & App. 1935); State ex rel. Milk Comm'n v. Galloway, 249 N.C. 658, 107
S.E. 631 (1959) ; Savage v. Martin, 161 Ore. 660, 91 P.2d 273 (1939) ; Reynolds v.
Milk Comm'n, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507 (1935); State ex rel. Finnegan v. Lincoln
Dairy Co., 221 Wis. 1, 265 N.W. 197 (1936).
82
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v.
Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949). In Daniel, the Court stated: "We
cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the funeral insurance business
an evil. Nor can we say that the statute has no relation to the elimination of those
evils. There our inquiry must stop." 336 U.S. at 224.
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83
discarding this type of due process inquiry as a tool of judicial review.
84
In the milk control area, comparatively recent decisions in Georgia and
South Carolina 85 have invalidated all price-fixing provisions of their state
programs on substantive due process grounds. Both courts found unconstitutional deprivation of property rights; 6 both held that the milk industry is not a business "affected with a public interest." 87
Commentators have typified Pennsylvania as one of the states in which
substantive due process is still very much alive.88 But the state supreme
court's position regarding the doctrine is not so easily classified.8 9 In
almost every area in which substantive due process attacks have been made
upon legislative regulation, conflicting language may be found 9 0 as to the
83 Carpenter, Our Constitutional Heritage: Economic Due Process and the State
Courts, 45 A.B.A.J. 1027 (1959); Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and
Substantive Due Process of Laws, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 226 (1958); Paulsen, The
Persistence
of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
84
Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 692 (1951). During the course of
the opinion, the Georgia court made explicit its disagreement with the Nebbia decision: "We are . . . impressed by the sound view expressed by Mr. Justice McReynolds in his dissenting opinion in Nebbia v. People of State of New York . .. ."
208 Ga. at 564, 67 S.E.2d at 694. The Georgia legislature has countered the Harris
decision with new legislation, designed to achieve indirect control over milk prices
while avoiding the constitutional difficulties engendered by direct price fixing. GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 42-551, -554 (Supp. 1960) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 42-553 (1957).
If the
elaborate procedure involved in making a sale under this "voluntary" system (based
on the Commission's "recommended" prices) is not followed, then the pricing orders
are binding. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-555.1 (Supp. 1960). The new statutory device
is untested in the Georgia courts.
85 Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673 (S.C. 1960).
8
6 Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 565, 67 S.E2d 692, 694 (1951) ; Gwynette v.
Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 676 (S.C. 1960).
87208 Ga. at 565, 67 S.E.2d at 694; 115 S.E.2d at 679.
88 Paulsen, supra note 83, at 117; Note, State Views on Economic Due Process:
1937-1953,
53 CoLUM. L. REv. 827, 835 n.60 (1953).
89
There is no doubt that many Pennsylvania cases use language which supports
this conclusion. E.g., Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 553, 101 A.2d 634,
638 (1954) (statute limiting size of signs advertising price of gasoline held unconstitutional) : "Unless a business is affected with a public interest, or unless there is
involved a question of monopoly in restraint of trade, the right of an owner to fix
a price at which his property shall be sold is an inherent attribute of the property
itself and as such within the constitutional protection of the requirement of due
process of law." In support of its statement, the court cites three pre-Nebbia cases
(Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,
274 U.S. 1 (1927) ; Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418 (1927)) and Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183 (1936). For other examples of Pennsylvania Supreme Court language revealing a substantive due process inclination, see Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v.
Sun Ray Drug Co., 383 Pa. 1, 17, 116 A.2d 833, 841 (1955) ; Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 40, 58 A.2d 464, 474-75 (1948) ; Flynn v. Horst,
356 Pa. 20, 25, 32, 51 A.2d 54, 57, 60 (1947). However, cases evincing an opposite
approach can be found, although they are perhaps fewer in number. See Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) ;
Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) ; Carolene Prods. Co. v. Harter, 329 Pa. 49, 59, 60, 197
At. 90627, 629, 630 (1938).
E.g., compare Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 111-12, 141 A.2d
696, 610 (1958), with Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393
Pa. 62, 72, 141 A.2d 851, 856 (1958). Compare Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v.
Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 40, 58 A.2d 464, 474-75 (1948), with Maurer v. Boardman, 336
Pa. 17, 22-25, 7 A.Zd 466, 471-73 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309
U.S. 598 (1940).
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extent of the judicial role in reexamining the premises and reasoning which
support the legislative conclusion that the regulation "is designed to serve
a proper public purpose." 9 Legislative regulation of economic activity
has not escaped this dual constitutional approach. On occasion, economic
regulation has been accepted with a judicial unhesitancy quite similar to the
federal attitude.92 On other occasions, language and action have not been
consistent even within the same case: for example, in holding constitutional
an act regulating the sale of evaporated skimmed milk, 3 the court intensively examined the purposes of the questioned act for seven pages, and
then concluded its discussion by noting that "the regulations and restrictions adopted by the legislature being within the general scope of its power,
and not being unreasonable, it is for that branch of the government, not the
courts, to determine the exact methods to be employed to promote the
public health, welfare and safety . . . . 94 _And in still other cases, the
state court has readily accepted a role which makes it the ultimate arbiter
of the purposes of legislation and the means used to accomplish them:
[A] law which purports to be an exercise of the police power must
not be unreasonable, unduly oppressive, or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the means which it employs must have a real
and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained. Under
the guise of protecting the public interests the legislature may not
arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. The question whether
any particular statutory provision is so related to the public good and
so reasonable in the means it prescribes as to justify the exercise of
the police power, is one for the judgment, in the first instance, of the
law-making branch of the government, but its final determination is
for the courts.9 5
91
Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71, 141
A.2d92851, 856 (1958).
See, e.g., Burche Co. v. General Elec. Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955).
But see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays, 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960). See also Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940) (fair sales act precluding retail
sales at prices below "cost" held unconstitutional).
93 PA. STAT. A.NN. tit. 31, §§ 551-58, 581-83 (1958).
94 Carolene Prods. Co. v. Harter, 329 Pa. 49, 59, 197 Ati. 627, 629 (1938).
95 Cott Beverage Corp. v. Horst, 380 Pa. 113, 118, 110 A.2d 405, 407 (1955).
Cott held that an act which prohibited the sale of articles of food and drink containing artificial sweetening agents, unless such articles carried an "appropriate
warning statement," was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to the use of "sucaryl,"
a nonfattening sweetener, in the manufacture of soft drinks. Note that this
treatment of the statute involves a substantive due process inquiry of a most
intensive nature: while the general legislative purpose in passing the statute-to
protect the public against products containing possibly harmful drugs-might be
commendable, "sucaryl" cannot, according to the court, be classified as harmful.
Such a treatment obviously involves an independent judicial examination of the
possible deleterious effects of "sucaryl" and an independent judicial judgment that
no such effects are reasonably likely to be caused by use of that substance. Compare
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955): "The Oklahoma law
[prohibiting opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from
an ophthalmologist or optometrist] may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
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Which fork of this dichotomous constitutional approach would be followed in the event of a renewed attack upon the milk control law, and
especially upon its price-fixing provisions, is far from dear. On the one
hand, the legislation has withstood numerous constitutional challenges in
the state supreme court " and the act's constitutionality is insulated by
emphatic judicial statements that the industry is undoubtedly affected with
a public interest.9 7 On the other hand, indications are not lacking that the
court will take cognizance of changed conditions which might "take away
the right of regulation." 9 8 Clearly, the counsel who persuades the court
that the widespread economic sickness of twenty-five years ago has been
substantially eradicated in the milk industry by forces other than regulation
will have brushed aside much of the buttressing weight of the previous
precedents and taken a long step toward securing de novo consideration of
the substantive due process aspects of minimum price regulation. But
having secured such a reconsideration, counsel must still show that the
specific evils which the legislature sought to remedy-and on whose presence the court rested its previous holdings of constitutionality-have been
so far eliminated that minimum price regulation no longer bears "a real
and substantial relation" to the public interest in insuring a wholesome
supply of milk.9 9 He must show that the industry's marketing structure"to which the conditions sought to be controlled by the Milk Control Laws
are directly attributable" '--no longer places the producer at the mercy of
many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of the new requirement." But cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 670 (1925): "[W]hen the legislative body has determined generally, in the
constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such
danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific
utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about
the substantive evil, is not open to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute
itself be constitutional and that the use of the language comes within its prohibition."
96See, e.g., Harrisburg Dairies v. Eisaman, 338 Pa. 58, 11 A.2d 875 (1940);
Colteryah Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775 (1938).
97
Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 272, 186 Atl. 336, 345 (1936); cf.
v. Horst, 356 Pa. 20, 51 A.2d 54 (1947).
Flynn
98
Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 263, 186 Atl. 336, 339 (1936).
99 As to specific changes in the methods of production, processing, and distribution, see HiNDs & JoHNsToNE, DA RY EcoNomIcs HANDBOOK 13-15 (U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture Handbook No. 138, 1958).
100 Harrisburg Dairies, Inc. v. Eisaman, 338 Pa. 58, 63, 11 A.2d 875, 877 (1940)
(holding constitutional the act's bonding provisions). The most significant change
in the market structure of the industry has been its increasing concentration, not
only at the processing and distributing level but also at the producing level. As to
processing and distributing, three of the dairy industry's largest members, National
Dairy Products Corp. (Sealtest), Borden Co. (Sylvan Seal), and Beatrice Foods
Co., have been charged with violating the antitrust laws by acquiring all or part of
the stocks or assets of 251 dairy companies since 1951. Federal Trade Commission
Complaints, Nos. 6651-53, cited in Memorandum on Behalf of Petitioner Country
Maid Dairies, Inc., p. 7, In re Philadelphia Milk Marketing Area, Milk Marketing
Area No. 1, Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Hearing, April 20, 1960, to June 23, 1960.
On the producing level, it has been estimated that the number of independent producing units in Pennsylvania has been decreasing at a rate of 800 units a year.
Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 27, 1960. Although the resulting large
units tend to be economically independent, it may be that the smaller operator, faced
with larger and more mechanized competition, needs protective legislation as much
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the dealer; 101 he must show that the danger of a return to the producer
less than the cost of production no longer is present; 102 he must show that
the "high cost of maintaining sanitary conditions of production and standards of purity" 103 is being returned to the producer and that the existence
of minimum price fixing--or at least minimum price fixing at secondary
and tertiary levels-bears no reasonable relation to this return. The
would-be attacker of the statute bears a heavy burden; but the recent
experience in Georgia and South Carolina demonstrates that it is a burden
which can be sustained.1° 4
B. Problems of Federalism
The effectiveness of state milk control regulation in accomplishing its
declared purposes is dependent to a large extent upon the capacity of the
state regulatory power to implement its controls on a state-wide basisor at least to regulate comprehensively within a given marketing area.
Unfortunately, however, marketing areas as defined by economic realities
do not correspond with the artificial, politically created boundaries between
the states.' 0 5 Milk, like most commodities, moves in commerce across state
lines, from producer to processor to distributor to consumer. This interstate movement not only creates conflict between milk control commissions
attempting to prescribe regulations and prices for milk produced in one
today as he did in the 1930's. Many Pennsylvania farmers claim that they cannot make
ends meet even with price protection. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
On the other hand, if larger dairies and producers could alone furnish an adequate
supply of milk, that purpose of the Milk Control Law might be achieved without the
elimination of price competition.
10 1
See Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 265, 186 Atl. 336, 340 (1936).
102 Ibid.
103 Historical Note, following PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,

§ 700j-101 (1958) (preamble to milk control act).
104 See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text. The Pennsylvania Milk Control Act has also withstood attack on the ground that it is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the Commission. See Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Co.
v. Milk Control Cormn'n, 341 Pa. 153, 18 A.2d 868 (1941) ; Rohrer v. Milk Control
Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 186 At. 336 (1936). Such an attack has been successful in other
states where similar statutes have been voided in that "the power of regulation has
been assigned . . . with no defined standard set for the manner or extent of its
exercise," Ferretti v. Jackson, 88 N.H. 296, 304-05, 188 At. 474, 480 (1936), or on
the grounds that the effectiveness of the act was contingent upon the request of "a
substantial proportion of the producers and/or consumers, and/or distributors," thus
resulting in a redelegation of power to the citizenry, Maryland Co-op. Milk Producers, Inc. v. Miller, 170 Md. 81, 87, 88, 182 Atl. 432, 434, 435 (1936). The Maryland court also noted the vagueness of the statutory language "substantial proportion"
and looked with disfavor on the discretion given to the administrative body in the
definition of the term. Other statutes whose operation is contingent upon voter
approval specify the numerical proportion necessary for effectiveness. See, e.g., N.Y.
AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 258(m) (6)
(two-thirds).
Such a numerical-proportion
provision was upheld in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577
(1939). The effectiveness of the Pennsylvania act is not contingent upon a request
by a certain number of those affected.
105 All of the seven major milksheds in the northeastern states area consist of
parts of two or more states. The Boston milkshed covers parts of seven states;
Philadelphia and New York, five states each; Washington and Pittsburgh, three
states each; and Baltimore and Connecticut, two states each. See Business Review,
April 1955, p. 12.

570

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.109:555

state and processed or consumed in another, but also involves the federal
government, through its power to regulate interstate commerce, in the
jurisdictional controversy over who can regulate what and under what
conditions.
1. Interstate Transactions and the State Regulatory Power
The mere fact that a transaction has interstate ramifications does not,
of course, automatically preclude the state from regulating the price at
which and the conditions under which it shall take place. An out-of-state
milk dealer, for example, cannot escape Pennsylvania's price controls by
setting up his own retail outlets in the commonwealth."1 6 The same is true
of deliveries from outside the state: the Supreme Court has held that the
state may validly impose minimum retail prices on such traffic, regardless
of the details of the transaction-sale and payment at the door, or payment
1 D7
to the dealer by check and delivery on a pre-order basis.
The extent to which the Pennsylvania Milk Control Law may operate
upon business of an interstate nature is illustrated by Milk Control Bd. v.
Eisenberg Farm Prods.08 Defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, operated a milk receiving plant in the northern part of the state and purchased
from 175 local farmers. These producers transported their milk to defendant, who held it without processing for less than twenty-four hours before
shipping the entire supply to New York for sale there. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found that Eisenberg's business was interstate in character
and held that state regulation of his buying oppressively burdened interstate
commerce. 1 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that,
inasmuch as the producer-receiver transaction occurred entirely within
Pennsylvania, state control of the sale placed only an incidental burden on
interstate commerce."" Important to the conclusion that the state regulation's effect on commerce was incidental and therefore not violative of the
commerce clause was the fact that only ten per cent of all milk produced
in Pennsylvania was eventually shipped to other states."' The "incidental
effect" doctrine might be difficult to sustain if the evidence in a similar case
106 Milk Control Comm'n v. McAllister Dairy Farms, 384 Pa. 459, 121 A.2d 144
(1956); see Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 603 (1937).
107 County Bd. v. State Milk Comm'n, 346 U.S. 932 (1954)
(per curian),
affirming an unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which
"affirmed" a lower court ruling by refusing to allow appeal. In the process of this
disposition, the supreme court stated that the lower court decree was "plainly right"
and that the effect of its denial was "to affirm the decree of the said circuit court."
County Bd. v. State Milk Comm'n, Va. Sup. Ct. App., Jan. 26, 1953. Cf. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920) ; Public Util. Comm'n v.
Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
108 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
109 Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 332 Pa. 34, 200 AtI. 854 (1938).
110 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
The Commission, however, has not exerted control over
such milk. See note 273 infra.
"'

306 U.S. at 353.
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of the state's production was chandemonstrated that a large percentage
2
neled into interstate commerce."
Despite the latitude which Eisenberg gives to state regulation, the
commerce clause does represent a limitation upon the power of the state
to regulate. And to the extent that this limitation prevents the state from
regulating comprehensively, it may also preclude the state from regulating
effectively. By acquiring milk from extrastate rather than intrastate producers, the milk dealer or retailer may escape some, but not all, of his
own state's price and trade regulations. Thus a Pennsylvania dealer purchasing milk from a producer in another state cannot be compelled by the
Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission to pay its minimum producer
prices, for such state control would unduly burden interstate commerce.113
Under the same reasoning, a local store owner is free to purchase milk from
an out-of-state dealer at a bargained price. 11 4 In these two instances, the
limitation of the state's attempt to provide uniform and comprehensive
regulation may bring about inequitable effects which play at cross purposes
with the goals sought by the state when the original regulatory scheme was
enacted. For example, posit two dairies operating in a competitive situation in the Pittsburgh area. One dairy buys its milk in Pennsylvania at
the minimum producer prices stipulated by the Milk Control Commission,
while the other buys from farmers in the Ohio market, free from state
regulation. If the latter's negotiated price is lower than the former's
regulated price, the dealer buying in Pennsylvania is competitively disadvantaged because of his own state's price regulation." 5 But the dealer
who buys in Ohio cannot pass his price advantage along to the consumer
in the form of lower prices, for upon resale he must comply with the Pennsylvania wholesale and retail minimum pricing structure; "16 his competitive
advantage can be reflected only in his profits. Under such circumstances,
it is unlikely that the dealer buying only in Pennsylvania will long continue his in-state purchasing policy. However, his shift to Ohio producers
-and their lower prices-clearly works to the detriment of his previous
Pennsylvania suppliers. Thus, legislation initially designed to protect the
income of the in-state producer results, in an interstate context, in a reduced
112 The Court in Eisenberg distinguished Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258
U.S. 50 (1922), and Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925), on the
grounds that in those cases ninety per cent of the product produced in the state
eventually went into interstate commerce. 306 U.S. at 353.
113 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). Nor need the dealer
be concerned over forfeiting bond upon failure to pay the out-of-state producer,
because the foreign producer cannot take advantage of the statutory bonding provisions. Milk Control Comm'n v. Valleywood Milk Co., 64 Pa. D. & C. 89 (C.P.
1949).
114 Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 614-15 (1937) (dictum).
115 In 1959 farmers in four of the six states bordering Pennsylvania received
lower prices for their milk than did Pennsylvania producers. The Pennsylvania
farmer received an average price for milk and cream of $4.91 per hundredweight.
Comparable prices in the bordering states were: Ohio, $4.16; New York, $4.58;
Maryland, $4.76; West Virginia, $4.79; Delaware, $4.95; and New Jersey, $5.44.

U.S.

AGRIc.

MKT. SERv., DAIRY

STATISTIcs

11-15 (Supp. 1959).

116 See Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
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demand for his higher-priced product and a consequent reduction of his
income.
It is doubtful that the inadequacy of single-state regulation can be
remedied by resort to informal interstate cooperation or to its more formalized counterpart, the interstate compact. This doubt is especially acute
in the case of Pennsylvania, since four of the six states bordering the cbmmonwealth have no milk price control program whatsoever. 1 7 Moreover,
there is little in the history of milk control legislation which would indicate
that any cooperative effort among the states could adequately cope with the
problem-few instances of successful cooperation can be singled out as
precedent for a new effort along these informal lines."" And never has a
formal compact been concluded; Pennsylvania legislation authorizing the
Milk Control Commission to enter into a five-state compact with regard
to the New York City marketing area has remained unimplemented for
thirteen years," 9 the original movement for the compact having failed because of doubts as to its necessity and its acceptability. 120 Certainly, the
diverse political interests between producer and consumer states (and
between similar groups within the same state) make the formulation of an
acceptable multistate compact unlikely, if not impossible.
2. Effect of Federal Controls
Control of milk marketing is not an exclusive function of the states;
the federal government also regulates the milk industry in specified localities
designated as federal marketing areas.' 2 1 Should these concurrent regulatory efforts not be coordinated, the effectiveness of both would obviously be
limited. A glaring example of such a lack of coordination and cooperation
currently exists in the Philadelphia milk marketing area, 22 where the federal
milk administrator, pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act,1 23 has established a minimum producer price below that promulgated
for the region by the state commission. 124 Beyond the actual effects of such
inconsistent regulation, however, there exists a legal issue as to whether the
"7 Delaware, Maryland, Ohio, and West Virginia have no legislation governing
milk price control.
118 See SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, MILK CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE NORTHEASTERN STATES pt 2, at 102-03 (Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station

Bull. 918, 1955).
119

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 700.1-.5 (1958).

120 SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 118, at 103-04.

See 49 Stat. 754, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(2) (1958).
See 7 C.F.R. § 961.5 (Supp. 1960).
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, § 608(c), 49 Stat. 753 (1935),
7 U.S.C. § 608c (1958).
124 7 C.F.R. § 961 (Supp. 1960).
The federal minimum prices are about fifty
to sixty cents per hundredweight lower than the Pennsylvania minimum prices established for the Philadelphia marketing area. Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub,
Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
July 15, 1960. The Commission has requested advice from the state attorney general
on the applicability of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Law in federally regulated
areas. Ibid.
121
122
123
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state controls can be effective at all-that is, whether the action of the federal government in a marketing area preempts state attempts to control the
subjects of federal regulation in the same area.l 5
If Congress intended that its legislation and subsequent administrative
action under that legislation should "occupy the field" 121 of milk regulation,
state extension or supplementation of the federal regulatory limits would
be precluded. 2 7 Such a congressional intent may be evidenced by an
express statement of federal exclusiveness in the statute; 128 but even where
the intent is not explicitly stated, it may be attributed to Congress through
a judicial finding that the "scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it," 129 or that the statute touches "a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," 130 or that
state regulation "presents a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program." 131
In the area of milk control, it is unnecessary to allude to these rather
unhelpful attributive tests of supersession, for sections 608c(5) (A) and
608c(5) (B) of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 132 contain language which strongly indicates that a state is precluded from supplementing
federal regulation. In prescribing the content of pricing orders, the statute
provides:
Such [minimum] prices [for each use classification] shall be uniform
as to all handlers, subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market,
and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (2) the grade or quality of the milk purchased, and
125 The problem is much simpler if the state has promulgated a lower minimum
price than that established by the federal government. In that case, the state control
would be in direct conflict with the federal regulation, and the former would have to
yield. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941); note 126 infra.
128 This power of Congress derives from the supremacy clause of the Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI. See Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co.,
237 U.S. 597 (1915) ; Ex parte McNeil, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 240 (1871).
See, e.g.,
127 The doctrine of federal preemption has been extensively treated.
Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 CoLum. L. REv. 995 (1934) ;
Note, Pre-EmptionBy Federal CriminalStatutes, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 83 (1955) ; Note,
60 HAMv. L. REv. 262 (1946) ; Note, 12 STAN. L. R1v. 208 (1959) ; Note, 86 U. PA. L.
REv. 532 (1938) ; 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1224 (1960).
128 See United States Warehouse Act, 46 Stat. 1465 (1931), 7 U.S.C. § 269
(1958), which provides that "the power, jurisdiction and authority conferred [by this
act] . . . shall be exclusive . . . ." However, even such explicit language may
not settle the question. See Note, 12 STAN. L. IEv. 208, 211 (1959).
129 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
130 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
131 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956).
132 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, §§ 608c(5) (A), (B) (i),
(B) (ii), 49 Stat. 754, 755 (1935), 7 U.S.C. §§ 608c(5) (A), (B) (i), (B) (ii) (1958).
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(3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any use classification thereof, is made to such handlers.
(B) Providing:
(i) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers
delivering milk to the same handler of uniform prices for all milk
delivered by them ....
(ii) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers delivering milk to all handlers of uniform prices for all milk so
delivered, irrespective of the uses made of such milk by the individual
handler to whom it is delivered; subject, in either case, only to adjustments . .

.

[identical to those listed above]. 1 33

The clear import of the statutory language is that uniformity of prices paid
to producers shall prevail, subject only to specified exceptions. State
regulation setting a different price is not such an exception, and the nonuniformity thereby introduced into a marketing area in which a federal
producer price is in effect does not seem to be reconcilable with the
statute. 134
State regulation of minimum producer prices is also difficult to square
with the statute where the local control has the effect of limiting the
marketing of milk in a federal area. 135 Section 608c(5) (G) states that:
"No marketing agreement or order applicable to milk and its products in
any marketing area shall prohibit or in any manner limit, in the case of the
products of milk, the marketing in that area of any milk or product thereof
produced in any production area in the United States." 136 With regard to
federal orders, there is some dispute as to whether the word "limit" in
this section applies to "milk" or only to "milk products." 137 However,
this disagreement was no deterrent to the Supreme Court in H. P. Hood
& Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,13 8 where section 608c(5) (G) was viewed as
relevant to New York's attempt to deny a license to a dealer who intended
to ship the purchased milk in interstate commerce. The Court stated that,
regardless of the construction given section 608c(5) (G), "the policy of
133 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

134 In other areas, state acts have been declared operative only until the federal
government regulates on the subject which the state seeks to control. See H. P.
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939) (state highway regulation operative
until effective date of ICC order); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State
Ry. Comm'n, 297 U.S. 471 (1936) (state order setting depreciation rates operative in
absence of ICC action); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913). See also
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where the Court, upholding California's power
to regulate the marketing of raisins, noted that the Secretary of Agriculture, operating under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, had in fact co-operated
with the state in implementing the state program. Id. at 352-59.
135 See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 542-43 (1949).
136 Agricultural Adjustment Act § 608c(5) (G), as amended, 49 Stat. 755 (1935),

7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (G) (1958).
137

See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 543 (1949).
U.S. 525 (1949).

3 8 336
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the provision is inconsistent with the State's contention that it may, in its

own interest, impose such a limitation as a coincident or supplement to
federal regulation." 139
Under the broad reading given the statute in Hood, it would seem
that in the legislative language proscribing federal obstruction of commerce,
there is implicit a similar prohibition of any state attempt to supplement
an applicable federal pricing order by setting a higher minimum price for
local producers within the jurisdiction of the federal marketing area. The
effect of this pricing practice by the state would be to induce local dealers
to go out of state in order to buy milk at the lower federal price. This
circumstance tends to limit the marketing of locally produced milk in the
affected federal marketing area, contrary to the mandate of section

608c(5) (G).
Another section of the statute lends additional strength to the argument that existing federal controls are to be exclusive. In an effort to
protect the consumer, the federal authority is specifically instructed to
authorize "no action . . . which has for its purpose the maintenance of
prices to farmers above the level which it is declared to be the policy of
. , 140 The area consumers in the regulating
Congress to establish ..
state would be forced to pay more for their milk than would otherwise
prevail under the federal price, inasmuch as the state establishes the retail
price and the mark-up to dealers based upon its higher producer's minimum.
Once again, if the federal agency cannot authorize an agreement which has
for its purpose the establishment of prices above the federal level, the
implication is that the state cannot do so unilaterally within the marketing
region.

141

3. Federal Control Over Intrastate Commerce
If existing federal controls take precedence over those of the state in
federal marketing areas, it becomes relevant to determine the extent to
which the national government-in the interests of uniformity and cohesive
regulation-may regulate milk in intrastate commerce. Although early
lower federal court decisions held that intrastate dealers did not have to
pay federally established minimum producer prices,'1 42 the Supreme Court,
336 U.S. at 544.
Adjustment Act § 602(2) (b), as amended, 49 Stat. 751 (1935),
7 U.S.C. § 602(2) (b) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
141 Cf. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 544-45 (1949): "These
sections and reports indicate that it is the deliberate policy of the Congress to prevent
federal officers from placing barriers in the way of the interstate flow of milk. While
a statutory prohibition against federal interference with certain phases of it may not
always imply that the state too is precluded, it is obvious that a state limitation on
export42 for the benefit of its own consumers is not authorized by this Federal Act."
1 Berdie v. Kurtz, 75 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1935) ; Royal Farms Dairy v. Wallace,
8 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1934); United States v. Neuendorf, 8 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.
Iowa 1934); United States v. Greenwood Dairy Farms, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.
Ind. 1934), appeal disnissed, 76 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1935); Douglas v. Wallace, 8
F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Okla. 1934); Hill v. Darger, 8 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Cal. 1934),
aff'd, 76 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1935); Edgewater Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121
(N.D. II. 1934), appeal dismissed, 75 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1935).
139

140Agricultural
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in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 143 held that a federal pricing
order in the Chicago milk market was applicable to milk produced and
handled entirely within the state of Illinois. The Court found that this
milk "competed" with interstate milk in the marketing area; thus, in order
to render effective the regulation of interstate transactions,144 it became
necessary to control also intrastate milk. While the fact that milk im145
ported from other states comprised forty per cent of the market supply
may give some support to the argument that the Wrightwood rule is limited
to situations in which a substantial part of an area's milk needs are met
through interstate commerce, a more recent district court case held that,
where out-of-state sources supplied merely one-half of one per cent of the
market's demand, there was sufficient interstate commerce to make the
federal pricing order applicable in the region. 146 Since no appeal was
taken in the case and since federal minimum price orders have been issued
without challenge in other marketing areas,147 it would seem that government producer-price regulation of milk in intrastate commerce has become
148
an accepted part of the federal regulatory scheme.
4. Sales to Agencies of the Federal Government
A federal-state problem of a somewhat different nature arises when a
state attempts to regulate the milk prices paid by federal installations and
agencies located within the regulating jurisdiction. One case involved a
request by the government purchasing officer for bids to supply milk to
the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, located in Pennsylvania. The
state milk commission notified dealers of the minimum price on which the
bidding was to be based. Penn Dairies underbid the minimum and was
promptly cited for violating the commission order. The resulting litigation
culminated in a United States Supreme Court decision upholding the
agency's order as applicable to sales made to the military reservation. 149
It was stressed that the camp was established by the United States on land
belonging to Pennsylvania under a permit which involved no surrender
of the state's jurisdiction or authority over the area.15 0 On the same day,
143315

U.S. 110 (1942).

144A similar argument was successful in upholding the applicability of § 605 of

the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958), to
wiretaps of strictly intrastate communications. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S.
321 (1939).
'45 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118 (1942).
146 Balazs v. Brannan, 87 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ohio 1949). See also United
States v. Adler's Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
657 (1940) ; United States v. Beck, 36 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Iowa 1941); United States
v. Krechting, 26 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Ohio 1939), appeals dismissed smb nora. J. H.
Berling Dairy Prods. Co. v. United States, 108 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir.), Wilier v. United
States, 108 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1940).
147 See SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 118, at 74.
14sThe trend is toward increased regulation by the federal government Ibid.
149 Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
150 Id.at 267.
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the Court decided Pacific CoastDairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture.151
There, California had attempted to regulate the minimum price to be
charged for milk sold to the Army installation at Moffett Field. The Court
held, however, that the state milk authority could not control the price
inasmuch as the base was situated on land ceded by California to the United
States. On this theory, state minimum pricing was proscribed by the
Constitution, which gives Congress power "to exercise exclusive legislation
. . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be .
,,152

This strict "cession" distinction 153 was severely criticized not only by
Justices Frankfurter and Murphy 154 but also by the thirty states which
joined California's petition for rehearing, 155 subsequently denied by the
Court. 58 State dissatisfaction with the rule may lead to attempts to carve
15
out exceptions to it,
such as concluding, whenever possible, that sales to

the government agencies are consummated in another part of the state
where the local milk control law is applicable. 158
The rigid application of the exclusive jurisdiction clause has adverse
effects on state milk control programs in "cession" states.159 First, inasmuch as the costs of servicing these agencies are not segregated from other
costs reported by the dealers, the final price determined by the commission must be sufficiently high to counteract the lower profits returned on
the sales to unregulated federal buyers. Second, if resale price control is
to be effective, it must extend to substantially all sales of milk within the
state; 160 and the impact of excluding sales to units of the federal govern151318

U.S. 285 (1943).

§ 8.
The exclusive jurisdiction clause has not always been so literally interpreted.

152 U.S. CONST. art. I,
153

See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940) ; cf. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
154 318 U.S. at 296, 303. "Opposite legal results are thus reached for precisely
the same practical situations. The justification for this incongruity . . .is attributed
to the difference in the nature of the Government's proprietary interest in each of the
two Army sites . . . . The power given to Congress by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution . . . is not so tyrannical as to preclude in law what good sense requires."
Id. at 298 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
155 SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 118, at 73.
156318 U.S. 801 (1943).
'57 Compare United States v. Sunshine Dairy, Inc., 215 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1954).
158 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, 318 U.S. at 302: "Is the result to
turn upon the niceties of the law of sales and contracts? Suppose, for example, that
the negotiations occur and the contracts are signed off Moffett Field, but delivery
takes place there. Must inquiry be made as to where title has 'passed' and the sale
consummated?" See Commonwealth v. Rohrer, 37 Pa. D. & C. 410 (C.P. 1940).
159 "Indeed both the federal government and the nation as a whole suffer if the
solution of legitimate matters of local concern is thus thwarted and local animosity
created for no purpose." 318 U.S. at 305 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
160 See Milk Control Comm'n v. Rieck Dairy Div., 193 Pa. Super. 32, 37, 163
A.Zd 891, 894 (1960) ; note 350 infra.
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Finally, it would seem that here it would be

appropriate to make every effort to construe the constitutional provision in
such a manner that problems attributable to our federal form of government would be minimized.162
IV. ESTABLISHING A MINIMUM PRICE

A. Hearings
The most important and by far the most difficult and controversial
task of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission is that of balancing the
conflicting interests of producers, dealers, and consumers in establishing
the minimum prices which the dealers must pay to producers and charge
to consurers. 63 In ascertaining and fixing the prices which the statutory
directive'characterizes as "most beneficial to the public interest," 164 the
Commission is required to hold hearings and base its determinations on the
evidence there received. 165 Hearings are generally held within a marketing
area 1 66 every eighteen months; 1 67 however, they may be called annually"
if costs are rising rapidly in the area.168 They can be initiated by the
agency 16 9 but are usually requested by producers or dealers.170
The procedural requisites of commission hearings received judicial
refinement in Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n,171 where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court elaborated on the statutory hearing
requirement. First, hearings before the Commission that involve price
fixing must be complete-evidence is not to be initially withheld by the
161 This is especially true if the government agencies are the largest buyers in
the state, as was the Indiantown Gap Reservation in Pennsylvania. The reservation
ordered 67,500 gallons of milk for a four-month period. Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk
Control
162 Comm'n, 148 Pa. Super. 261, 263, 24 A.2d 717, 718 (1942).
See 318 U.S. at 305-06 (Murphy, J., dissenting); cf. Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
163 MmIK CONTROL LAW §§ 700j-802, -803.
164 MILm CONTROL LAW § 700j-801.
15 Ibid. In Judson v. Milk Control Comm'n, 56 Dauph. Co. Rep. 405 (C.P.
1945), where the Commission had issued a pricing order without first holding a
hearing, it was held that the requirement of § 700j-801 that a hearing be held is
mandatory and an order made without compliance with the requirement is void. The
Commission is also required to hold a second hearing or conference to effectuate its
order and may also change an order within twenty days after the effective date
without a further hearing, provided that the revision is founded upon evidence received at the latest hearing. MIL CONTROL LAW § 700j-801. All of the milk control
states except Connecticut and New Jersey require hearings to be held before the
issuance of price-fixing orders. SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, MILK CONTROL PROGRAMS
OF THE NORTHEASTERN STATES pt. 1, at 13 (Cornell University Agricultural Experi-

ment Station Bull. 908, 1954).
166 Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 27, 1960.
167 Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control
Commission,
in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960.
16
8 Ibid.
169 MILK CONTROL LAW § 7003-801.
170 Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960.
171 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775 (1938).
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interested parties and later presented on appeal. 172 Second, whenever a
pricing order is issued, a general statement of findings of fact, along with
reasons for the order, must be filed. 173 Third, the procedure required for
changing or revising an order is the same as that to be followed in
promulgating an order.174 Fourth, the production of proof before the
Commission is not subject to strict rules of evidence.17 5 Fifth, the results of
any survey taken by the agency "should be placed on the record of the
hearing . . . and the parties who made the survey should be subject to
such cross-examination as is proper." 176 Sixth, "interested parties should
be accorded opportunity to test the reliability of the Commission's evidence
before an order is promulgated, revised or changed." 177
Although these standards are normally satisfied in practice, deviation
has occurred. For example, the informal evidentiary standard is sometimes
forsaken for lengthy argument on the admissibility of evidence or the
propriety of a line of questioning. 178 The recent hearing concerning
Country Maid Dairies' proposed introduction into the Philadelphia marketing area of the gallon jug container 17--which would make milk available
172 Id. at 21, 1 A.2d at 779: "By this it is meant that all 'essential facts in the
first instance' should be submitted 'to the Commission at its hearing' either by the

dealers or the producers in any application for change of price or contest over price
...
. It was not the intention of the legislature that dealers or producers should
withhold evidence at such hearing, and then, on appeal, submit that evidence to the
Dauphin County court, thus presenting an entirely new case ..
173 322 Pa. at 20, 1 A.2d at 778.
174 Ibid.
175 322 Pa. at 21, 1 A.2d at 778.
See notes 178-84 infra and accompanying
text.
176 322 Pa. at 21, 1 A.2d at 778.
177 Ibid. The Commission may also be required to grant a continuance if such
is justified by the situation. In one case defendant's counsel was called out of town
on the day of a hearing involving complicated questions of law and fact in regard to
defendant's underpayments to farmers. Defendant requested a continuance of three
hours so that his counsel could be present, but the Commission refused. It was held
that the refusal to grant the continuance was unreasonable under § 700j-906, and the
case was remanded to the Commission with directions to take further testimony.
See Levengood v. Eisaman, 36 Pa. D. & C. 184 (C.P. 1940). But where the city
solicitor of Pittsburgh was denied a continuance which he requested in order to
allow him to prepare for cross-examination of a commission witness, the refusal
was held not violative of due process inasmuch as the city had received twenty days
advance notice of the hearing and the same expert witness had given the same testimony at previous hearings. The court indicated that the city had ample time and
was on notice of what would be presented at the hearing and therefore should have
been prepared to cross-examine. See City of Pittsburgh v. Milk Control Comm'n,
68 Dauph. Co. Rep. 127 (C.P. 1955).
178 Cf. Milk Control Comm'n v. Nicoson, 57 Pa. D. & C. 166 (C.P. 1946).
On
appeal of a hearing in which the Commission had revoked a dealer's license, the court
found "the record presented . . . most unsatisfactory for the purposes of an intelligent review. Of the 59 pages of testimony, well over half of them are taken up
by objections (particularly on the part of double counsel for the commission), rulings,
statements, colloquies between opposing counsel and between counsel and the hearing
commissioner. As a result of these persistent interjections, and interpolations, the
normal sequence has been practically destroyed and it is most difficult to properly
appraise the value of the testimony that is in the record." Id. at 167.
179 JI re Philadelphia Milk Marketing Area, Milk Marketing Area No. 1, Pa.
Milk Control Comm'n Hearing, June 17, 1960 (Country Maid Dairies' petition to
introduce the sale of milk in gallon jugs in the Philadelphia milk marketing area).
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at four or five cents less than the present home price 180 -was a considerable departure from the informal and procedurally relaxed norm. Each
time counsel for Country Maid asked a question in cross-examining a
Philadelphia dairy witness, they were met by objections from one or more
of the numerous lawyers representing dealers in the Philadelphia region.' 8 '
Then would follow long dissertations on the allowance or disallowance of
the question, which was often re-read by the stenographer to remind the
adversaries of the subject of their argument. 8 2 At times the Commission
found it necessary to call a recess to rule on an objection. 1 83 Although informality in the extreme might be equally objectionable, the type of procedure illustrated by the Country Maid case does not lead to speedy
hearings, clear and concise records for courts to review on appeal, 18 4 or
efficient use of the funds allocated to the milk commission.
1. Evidence: General Considerations
The criteria to be utilized by the Commission in its determination are
indicated in broad form by section 700j-801 of the Milk Control Law:
The commission shall base all prices upon all conditions affecting the
milk industry in each milk marketing area, 8 5 including the amount
necessary to yield a reasonable return to the producer, which return
shall not be less than the cost of production and a reasonable profit
to the producer, and a reasonable return to the milk dealer or handler.
In ascertaining such returns, the commission shall utilize a crosssection representative of the average or normally efficient producers
86
and dealers or handlers in the area.
Final decision by the Commission is still pending. Chairman Mahood indicated that
resolution of the case will not only be difficult, but will require a considerable
amount of time, since the hearing covered eighteen days and resulted in over 3,500
pages of testimony. Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960.
180 Brief for Petitioner, p. 2, In re Philadelphia Milk Marketing Area, supra
note 179.
181 Much of the dispute concerned direct testimony that the gallon jug would
provoke price wars in the Philadelphia region. Although commission attorney Weintraub pointed out that this evidence is irrelevant in a regulated market, the testimony
was admitted. Upon cross-examination, counsel for Country Maid Dairies attempted
to show what occurred in the alleged price war areas. Every time he questioned the
witness on the practices of one of the dairies in those sectors, however, the attorney
representing that particular dealer would object-usually on the ground that the
sole question was the existence of a price war and that inquiries as to who starts
them or how they are conducted are irrelevant. It would seem that once the price
war issue was injected into the hearing, exploration of the cause of this "competition"
should be allowed. Observation of In re Philadelphia Milk Marketing Area, supra
note 179.
2
18 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 See Milk Control Comm'n v. Nicoson, 57 Pa. D. & C. 166, 167 (C.P. 1946).

185 There are thirteen milk marketing areas currently delineated within Pennsylvania.
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The Colteryahn case sharpened these general rules to some extent. The
court stated that all factors which enter into the conduct of the milk
industry should be considered in arriving at a minimum price, and the
scope of the Commission's inquiry should extend to consideration of the
maintenance of a just consumer's price, the adjustment of supply and
demand, and a fair return to the producer and dealer which will not only
compensate for reasonable operating expenses but permit an adequate profit
on investment.18 7 In determining "fair return," the agency should not
select the most efficient producers and dealers but should use a cross-section
of the normally efficient operators in the district.' 88 Milk prices in other
areas should not be taken as a guide unless it appears that the region
189
Alprovides a fair comparison and the conditions in each are similar.
outline,
judicial
and
this
legislative
though the Commission has the aid of
the supreme court emphasized that, in the final analysis, it is the agency's
responsibility to determine the factors relevant to setting the minimum
price and that such price determinations will not be disturbed unless the
exclusion or inclusion of certain items is arbitrary or capricious. 190
In practice, the Commission's pricing orders are usually based not only
on evidence produced by the parties represented at the hearing but also
upon evidence brought forth by the agency on its own initiative. Despite
the rule that any interested person may submit evidence, 191 the participation
of the different interest groups varies considerably. Because of lack of
organization and a somewhat justified feeling of ineffectiveness when appearing individually, 192 consumers have rarely been present at the hearings. 193

194
The dairies have been the most vociferous group.

Producers,

like consumers, seldom present evidence on an individual basis, but they do
participate in hearings through representatives of their group. 195
87
. Colteryalm Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 27, 1 A.2d
781
(1938).
775,
18 Ibid.
189 332 Pa. at 31, 1 A.2d at 783.
190 332 Pa. at 32, 1 A.2d at 783.
19' MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-801.
192 See, e.g., Interview With John J. Ormand, Director of Purchases for Linton's
Restaurants, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 21, 1960; Interview With James F. Hutton,
Executive Vice President, and Lee F. Driscoll, Jr., General Counsel, both of the
Slater System Co., in Philadelphia, Pa., June 15, 1960. The difficulty of an attempt
by wholesale consumers to obtain a price change beneficial to them is indicated by
Milk Control Comm'n v. United Retail Grocers Ass'n, 361 Pa. 221, 64 A.2d 818
(1949), and Food Distribs. Ass'n v. Milk Control Comm'n, 60 Dauph. Co. Rep. 183
(C.P. 1949) ; see notes 260-71 infra and accompanying text.
193 See SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. mupra note 165, at 33; PA. ST. UNIV.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURAL EcON. AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY, JOURNAL SERIES PAPER No.
1807, CONSUmER KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION OF STATE MILK CONTROL IN PENNSYLVANIA 13-15 (1953).
194 Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960; Interview With Marvin D.
Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia,
Pa., July 15, 1960.
195 PA. ST. UNIV. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURAL ECON. AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY, Op. Cit.
supra note 193, at 13.
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2. Producer Participation
Evidence introduced by producers is directed primarily toward showing the cost of production and includes such items as the population of
dairy herds and the supply of milk in the area, 1 6 the condition of pastures,
the amount of rainfall, cost of feed and other products, wage rates, the
availability of farm labor, and milk prices in other areas. 19 7 The reliability
of this evidence is difficult to appraise inasmuch as it consists largely of
observations gathered by the producer representatives from individual
farmers, who do not ordinarily keep extensive records or maintain accounting departments19s It is often questionable Whether such presentations
satisfy the requirement of section 700j-801 that the Commission utilize a
cross section representing the average or normally efficient producers and
dealers in the area. To guard against an unrepresentative sample, the
Commission has sponsored and relied upon periodic studies of production
costs conducted by the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural
Sociology of the Pennsylvania State University. 199
Producers are far from pleased with the minimum prices set for their
products by the Commission. In a survey conducted by Pennsylvania State
University, two-thirds of the 1,121 farmers interviewed believed that the
price they received for milk did not cover their production costs.2 0° While
the lack of cost and receipt records might cast doubt on the reliability of
this figure, a 1948 study of Pennsylvania dairy farms seems to support
the farmers' contention.2 01 Inefficiency in production may be one cause of
the smaller farmer's unfavorable financial situation; 202 the prohibitive price
tags on the machinery needed to become "efficient" and the slim or nonexistent profit margin which results from unmechanized operation have
203
caused Pennsylvania to lose 800 to 1,000 dairy farmers annually.
3. Dealer Interests
The principal purpose of the evidence submitted by the dairies is t6
show the cost of distribution; often, however, only the records of dairies
196 See Food Distribs. Ass'n v. Milk Control Conmm'n, 60 Dauph. Co. Rep. 183
(C.P. 1949) (evidence showing effect of profits on herd population).
L97 SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 165, at 32.
98
1 PA. ST. UNIV. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURAL ECON. AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY, op. cit.
supra note 193, at 17.
199 SPENcER & CHRISTENSEN, op. cit. supra note 165, at 32.
2 00

PA. ST. UNIV. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURAL ECON. AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY, op. Cit.

spra note 193, at 16.
201 Unpublished data from a survey of costs of producing milk conducted in 1948
by the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at the Pennsylvania State University and supervised by R. D. Hess, as reported id. at 17 & n.13.
202 Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 27, 1960.
203 Ibid. The producer problem is discussed in connection with the economic
value of the price control legislation at notes 36-46 supra and accompanying text.

1961]

PENNSYLVANIA MILK CONTROL

with high costs and low profits are presented.2° 4 To obtain a more representative picture of milk marketing within the area, the agency conducts
its own survey,2 0 5 using information gleaned from the monthly operations
reports 206 and yearly financial statements which the dairies are required
,to file with the Commission. 2 07 After a random audit of the entire market
area and audits of all dealers who show a substantial increase in a cost item
within a year,208 the statistical department of the agency tabulates the
dairies' financial statements, with discretion to include or omit from the
20 9
compilation all or part of the records of various dealers in the area.
The Commission then must have one of its witnesses place the results of the
survey in the record so that interested parties may have an opportunity to
cross-examine with regard to the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the
report. 210
At a recent hearing inthe Pittsburgh milk marketing area, initiated
by the dairies seeking an alteration in minimum prices, the agency submitted a survey of seventy dealers handling eighty-nine per cent of the
class I and IA milk sales volume in the region. The-report sought to
delineate the financial circumstances of an average dairy in order to aid
the Commission in determining the need for a price change. The survey
demonstrated that the seventy dealers had an average return on net worth
of 10.39% of annual sales, an average return on net capital of 7.19% of
annual sales, and an average net profit before taxes of 2.96% of annual
sales. When seven dealers operating at a loss were excluded from the
compilation, the remaining dairies showed average return on net worth of
10.99% of sales, average return on employed capital of 7.52%o of sales, and
average net profit before taxes of 3.157 of sales. Finally, three dealers
who had comparatively high bperating costs were eliminated, and the com204

Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960; Interview With former
attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 8,
1960; see Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d
775 (1938).
205 Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 27, 1960.
200"This report of Production, Receipts, Purchase, Sale, Manufacture and
Classification of Payments to Producers and Dealers shall be filed not later than the
-22nd day of each month for the preceding month." Milk Dealer's Monthly Report
(Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Form 62).
207 Mn.xI CONTROL LAW § 700j-702; see SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, MnIK CONTROL
PROGRAMS OF THE NORTHEASTERN STATES pt. 2, at 100 (Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. 918, 1955).
20 Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 27, 1960. For example, Mr.
Pfautz indicated that a milk dealer's usual cost of advertising is less than one per
cent of the sales dollar. Therefore, if a dealer shows a seven per cent cost allocation
for advertising, his statement is audited. However, Mr. Pfautz noted that usually
the dealers' statements are fairly accurate; rarely does the Commission audit more
than five per cent of the reports.
209 See notes 186 and 188 mipra and accompanying text. This procedure is illustrated in the Pittsburgh survey method set out in text at notes 211-14 infra.
21
oColteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 21, 1 A.2d
775, 779 (1938).
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parable figures for the remaining sixty were 11.48%, 7.69o, and 3.22%.
The milk commission found that these sixty dealers were representative
of the average or normally efficient dealers in the area 2 11 and that the ten
excluded dairies distorted the norm. 212 On the evidence as thus viewed, it
was concluded that an increase of one-half cent per quart was sufficient to
cover increased operating costs 2 1 3 and to allow these average dealers a

reasonable return, while at the same time continuing milk as a relatively
2 14
cheap commodity.
It is not surprising that some dairies are of the opinion that the established prices generally favor the producer.21 5 But there is a substantial
amount of opinion that the Commission favors the dairies in its price
determinations.2 1 6 The chairman of the Commission, in offering an explanation for this feeling, stated that, since the agency bases its decisions
on the evidence adduced at the hearings, it is only natural that the group
presenting the most reliable evidence in the largest quantities stands the
best chance of convincing the Commission that its position is the correct
one and of securing a favorable price.2 17 Certainly there is nothing improper about persuasive advocacy. But if the chairman's explanation is
true, the Commission is allowing itself to be convinced by quantity rather
than quality, for even the agency-by conducting its own surveys to determine average dairy costs-tacitly admits that the dairies' own figures are
not completely reliable. Regardless of the validity of the dairy favoritism
charge, however, it cannot be doubted that increased participation by other
interests, counterbalancing the representation of the dairies, would be
desirable.
211 The failure to eliminate "the most efficient . . . dealers" was not a violation
of the Colteryahn rules. See text accompanying note 188 supra. In this instance,
there were no dairies which stood out above the rest.
212 Findings of Fact in Support of Official General Order No. A-587 Amending
Official General Order No. A-578, Regulating the Pittsburgh Milk Marketing Area,
Area No. 2, p. 4, July 13, 1960.
213 The cost increase was primarily due to an increase in the wage rate. Interview With John S. Pfautz, Director of Research for the Pennsylvania Milk Control
Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 27, 1960. Certain dealers have expressed
apprehension over the rapid rise in the wage rate. That labor might price itself
out of work is not an unreal possibility; many drivers in New York were rendered
jobless when labor costs rose so high that it was not economically feasible to continue
door-to-door service. Interview With Robert J. Harbison, III, President of Harbison
Dairies, Inc., in Philadelphia, Pa., June 23, 1960.
214 Findings of Fact in Support of Official General Order No. A-587 Amending
Official General Order No. A-578, Regulating the Pittsburgh Milk Marketing Area,
Area No. 2, pp. 6-7, July 13, 1960.
215 Interview With Robert J. Harbison, III, President of Harbison Dairies, Inc.,
in Philadelphia, Pa., July 7, 1960; see Interview With John B. Martin, Counsel for
the Philadelphia Milk Dealers Association, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 7, 1960. For a
case finding that a commission order classifying milk and milk payments favored one
producer group over another, see Weiss v. Milk Control Comm'n, 71 Dauph. Co.
Rep. 47 (C.P. 1957).
216 See, e.g., Interviews With Wholesale Consumers at the 1960 Convention of
the Pennsylvania Restaurant Owners Association, in Galen Hall Mountain Resort,
Pa., 217
June 28-29, 1960.
Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960.
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There is no evidence that the alleged commission unfairness in pricing
determinations is a product of conscious favoritism or corruption. Those
who have worked closely with the agency are of the opinion that it attempts
to be unbiased in fixing minimums. 218 To some extent the charges are a
natural by-product of advocating one's interest to the full. A considerable
portion of this feeling also emanates from people who are somewhat removed from commission activities 219 and who may not be aware of the
difficulties inherent in setting an equitable price. This is not to say that
the system of regulation does not benefit the distributors to the detriment
of the consumers. Dairy satisfaction with the status quo,2 0 in part due
to the insulation from competition afforded by any price-fixing scheme,
is increased by the ease with which the minimums may be avoided where
this is found to be advantageous. In this respect-laxness of enforcement 2 2 -the Commission may be regarded as "favoring" the distributors'
interests.
4. Consumer Protection
While the farmers have to some degree achieved greater participation by having members of their group act in their behalf,222 the consumer-

though recognizing that the hearing is the proper forum for the presentation of his case,223 has remained inert 24 In view of this lack of representation, the Commission must take special care in protecting the interests
of the buying public. It would not be improper for the agency, using processes similar to the supplementation of deficient dealer evidence, to make
its own investigation and determination of consumer needs and abilities.
There are indications that some members of the state legislature are
aware of the difficulties of consumer advocacy. In 1959, a bill was introduced in the General Assembly which provided for a "Bureau of Consumer
Protection." 25 As introduced, the bill gave the bureau broad powers to
aid the buying public:
(1) To present and represent the viewpoint of the consuming
public in matters before any . . . agency of the State . .

.

includ-

ing but not limited to any proceedings seeking a change of rates or
services or costs of services or commodities ....
218
Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960.
219 This appears to be the general attitude of the wholesale consumers interviewed
and to whom questionnaires were sent.
220 See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
221 See text preceding note 350 infra.
222 See note 195 supra.

224

See notes 192-93 supra.
Ibid.

225

Pa. H.R. 2347, 143d Gen. Ass. (1959).

223
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(5) To foster the creation and activities of independent consumer
organizations to promote consumer education and to cooperate with
existing consumer representatives.
(6) To conduct studies, investigations and research in all matters
affecting consumer interests, advise the executive and legislative
branches on matters affecting consumer interests, assist in developing executive policies and legislative programs to protect the consumer, secure all available information on . . . costs of commodities
and services and make such information available to the various
6
agencies of government and to the public.2
The bill also notes that the bureau's functions would not be a substitute
for the duty of the milk commission and "other agencies . . . to safeguard the consumer." 227 Although amendment restricted the bureau's
duties to public utility matters,2 2 8 further revision restored the measure's
original scope.22 Unfortunately, the proposed legislation failed to pass.2 0
Should the bill be reintroduced this year, enactment would be a step toward
the realization of the goal of milk pricing policies which properly reflect
the interests of consumers as well as of dealers and producers.
B. Judicial Review of Pricing Orders
General commission orders fixing or revising minimum prices may be
appealed to the court of common pleas for Dauphin County.231 Further
appeal from that court's decision will lie to the Pennsylvania Supreme
22
22

6 Pa. H.R. 2347, 143d
7 Ibid.

Gen. Ass. § 1 (1959).

228 Pa. H.R. 2347, 143d Gen. Ass. (1959)
(as amended on second reading).
Aside from doing "such other acts as may be incidental to the exercise of its powers
and functions," the bureau's activities were limited to presenting the consumer interest "relating to any proceedings seeking a change of rates or services or costs of

services in public utility matters .

.

.

."

This amended version also stated that

"the duties and functions of the [bureau] . . . shall not be in substitution for the
obligation of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

....

"

The reference to

the milk commission and other agencies was deleted.
22936 PA. LEGISLATIVE J. 4153-54 (1959) (as amended on third reading). As
restored, subsections 5 and 6 of the original bill were inserted unchanged as subsections 4 and 2. The important first subsection was changed to give the bureau the
power to represent the interests of the consumer before agencies "including but not
limited to any proceedings seeking a change of rates or services or costs of charges
in matters by State agencies .

.

.

."

The provision relating to the continued con-

sumer obligations of other agencies, formerly limited to the public utilities commission,
was also revised. The reference to the utilities agency was deleted and the provision
was made to read "[bureau functions] shall not be in substitution of the obligation
of other agencies having a duty to safeguard the consumer."
230The bill was defeated on final reading, November 17, 1959. The vote was
very close-89 supporting the measure, 94 opposed. HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS &
RESOLUTIONS, SESSION OF 1959, at 269 (1959) (final issue).
231

MILK

CONTROL LAW

§ 700j-901.

Special

orders directed to a

particular

person or persons, such as revocations and suspensions, are appealable in the common
pleas court of the residence or place of business of the recipient of the order. If the
aggrieved party has neither within the commonwealth, the proper court is the Dauphin
County common pleas court. MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-902.

19611
Court. 2
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If an appeal questions the correctness of an order, it must be

taken within twenty days after the order is issued; 233 an appeal after this
date is considered a collateral attack and will not be allowed.234 However,
an argument based on the milk commission's lack of authority or constitutional right to make such an order will be heard if brought within a reasonable time after the statutory period has run.2
1. Standing
The mandate of section 700j-801-that the Commission shall hold a
hearing "in which all interested persons shall be given reasonable opportunity to be heard" 2 36-allows a wide class to submit evidence at the hearing. However, those who may appeal from a commission order comprise
a considerably narrower group; section 700j-901 provides that the wouldbe appellant must be a "person aggrieved." 2 3 7 The problem of when one
has an interest of sufficient magnitude to support an appeal is a question
for the court; the agency has no power to stipulate that a particular party
is an aggrieved person.m8 In deciding the issue, the judiciary has given
the statutory language a more restrictive meaning than a literal reading
would indicate: to qualify as "aggrieved," a party must demonstrate that
the order he wishes to question has a direct adverse effect upon his
pecuniary interests.23 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has twice dealt with the issue of an
appellant's standing to question an order of the Commission. Colteryahn
Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n 2 40 merely stated the obvious:
where the order establishes prices pertaining to a particular group, that
232 ILX CONTROL LAW § 7001-908. Further appeal of special orders may be
taken by either party to the superior court. Ibid. However, if the action originates
as a summary criminal case before a justice of the peace and there is a reversal of
conviction in the common pleas court, the Commission may not appeal further. Commonwealth v. Hollinger, 170 Pa. Super. 180, 84 A.2d 794 (1951). This is in accord
with the usual Pennsylvania rule regarding criminal defendants. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Weber, 66 Pa. Super. 180 (1917).
:3 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-901.
234
Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 186 Adt. 336 (1936); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A.2d 299 (1941), aff'd per curiam, 345 Pa.
456, 28 A.2d 894 (1942); Commonwealth v. Ziegler Dairy Co., 139 Pa. Super. 224,
11 A.2d 669 (1940).
23
5 Rohrer v.Milk Control Bd., .rpranote 234; Milk Control Comm'n v.Hollinger,
Pa. Super. 180, 84 A.2d 794
79 Pa. D. & C. 49 (Quar. Sess.), appeal quashed, 17.0

(1951).

CONTROL LAw § 700j-801.
MIL CONTROL LAw § 700j-901: "Any person aggrieved by an order of the
commission fixing, revising or amending the price at, or the terms upon, which milk
may be bought or sold, or by any other general action, rule, regulation or order of
236 MILK
237

the commission, may . . . file an appeal therefrom . ..
238

."

Pennsylvania Commercial Drivers Conference v. Milk Control Comm'n, 360
Pa. 477, 62 A.2d 9 (1948).
239 "And not only must a party desiring to appeal have a direct interest in the
particular question litigated, but his interest must be immediate and pecuniary, and
not a remote consequence of the judgment." 360 Pa. at 484, 62 A.2d at 13.
240332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775 (1938).
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group may appeal since the order unquestionably has an immediate and
direct effect upon their interests. 241 Pennsylvania Commercial Drivers'
Conference v. Milk Control Comm'n 242 raised a more troublesome problem.
The milk commission had issued an order limiting home deliveries by
dairies to every other day. This method of delivery was originally instituted by the Federal Office of Defense Transportation as a wartime
measure directed toward the conservation of gasoline and rubber; after the
war emergency ended, every-other-day delivery was adopted by the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission on the ground that it resulted in lower
distribution costs which in turn allowed lower consumer prices. 248 The
union argued that the frequency of deliveries was a matter appropriately
left to the collective bargaining process and that "the order limits .
the obligations of milk dealers .

.

. to reemploy veterans .

. and also

244
destroys employment opportunities and job security in the industry."
The supreme court avoided the merits by holding that the union did not
have sufficient standing to prosecute the appeal:

But [the union] . . . interest in this proceeding is obviously not a
direct interest, but an interest that is too remote to constitute a person
aggrieved; it is not an interest that at the time the order was made
was the subject of pecuniary consideration to appellants in any collective bargaining then in process; it may never become a subject of
such consideration and therefore does not constitute a substantial interest in this proceeding affecting appellant.245
The court disregarded the union's obviously strong interest in the number
of days available for truck delivery on the reasoning that "the general order
appealed from is capable of directly affecting only 'Persons engaged in
business as milk dealers, handlers or distributors,' 'consumers' and producers." 246 It is difficult to comprehend how the producer, consumer, or
retail store interest is any more direct than that of the union and its
drivers.
A few early lower court cases, each involving secondhand pecuniary
injury, had read the standing requirements in a more liberal manner and
Pa. at 25-26, 1 A.2d at 780-81.
360 Pa. 477, 62 A.2d 9 (1948).
243 360 Pa. at 479, 480, 62 A.2d at 11.
244 Burns v. Milk Control Comm'n, 63 Pa. D. & C. 126, 128 (C.P. 1947).
245 Pennsylvania Commercial Drivers' Conference v. Milk Control Comm'n, 360
Pa. 477,
484, 62 A.2d 9, 13 (1948).
246
Id. at 484, 62 A.2d at 13. When a dairy contested a conviction for violating
the commission order of every-other-day delivery in Milk Control Comm'n v. Hollinger, 79 Pa. D. & C. 49 (Quar. Sess.), appeal quashed, 170 Pa. Super. 180, 84 A.2d
794 (1951), the court found that the agency had exceeded its delegated power in
promulgating the order and held it void. Although the Hollinger case nullified the
agency action, the Commission has not considered the case controlling and has continued the regulation in most parts of the state. See Harbison's Dairy, A. & I.
No. W-146 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 3, 1959); Levengood Dairies, A.
& I. No. W-42 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Sept. 15, 1958).
241332
242
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allowed appeal from the Commission's order;

247

this aspect of these deci-

sions, however, must be deemed overruled by the Commercial Drivers case.
Although the Pennsylvania appellate courts have not since spoken concerning the standing needed to attack milk commission orders, 248 the subsequent county reports evidence no deviation from the rule espoused in
2 49

Commercial Drivers.

2. The Burden of Proof and Substantial Evidence
When an order of the Commission is challenged on appeal, the court
must determine whether the agency's action is "reasonable and in conformity with law." 250 In challenging a general pricing order, the appellant must show that the Commission's result is "unreasonable or illegal," 25'
and in measuring the order's reasonableness, the courts have utilized the
test that the order must be supported by substantial evidence..2 52 The rigor
247
Wilson v. Milk Control Comm'n, 57 Pa. D. & C. 452 (C.P. 1946); Local
Union No. 205 v. Milk Control Commnn, 55 Dauph. Co. Rep. 254 (C.P. 1944).
In Wilsos, the Commission had revoked a dealer's license; twenty-four producers
who had sold milk to this dealer appealed. They claimed to be aggrieved because
the order would require them "to find other markets for their milk and find other
persons to haul their milk to market, requiring them to receive less money for their

milk .

.

.

."

57 Pa. D. & C. at 453.

The court allowed the appeal.

It is arguable

that a producer in these circumstances may appeal even under the more stringent
rule of Commercial Drivers. Such an argument relies heavily on the language in
that case to the effect that producers might properly have challenged the Commission's
every-other-day order. But if the "direct" test there enunciated means what it says,
producers have standing in neither situation. See notes 242-46 smpra and accompanying text In the Local Union case, the union sought to overturn an agency ruling
establishing a price for milk sold at the store which was lower than the door delivery
price. The appellant's contention was that "the differential would result in disruption
and confusion in the delivery and distribution of milk to home consumers." Local
Union No. 205 v. Milk Control Comn'n, 55 Dauph. Co. Rep. 254, 267 (C.P. 1944).
The court held that the union's interest was adequate to support the appeal. If the
possibility of fewer jobs for union members because of every-other-day delivery was
not a sufficient interest in the Commercial Drivers case, it is clear that the possibility
of fewer jobs for union members because of an increase in store purchases cannot
be regarded as an interest sufficient to give standing today.
248 The Commercial Drivers rule retains vitality in other areas of Pennsylvania
law. Compare Elliott Estate, 388 Pa. 321, 131 A.2d 357 (1957), and Commuters'
Comm. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 170 Pa. Super. 596, 88 A.2d 420 (1952),
with Delaware County Natl Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416 (1954).
The rule was applied but more liberally interpreted in Hazle Township Annexation
Case, 183 Pa. Super. 212, 130 A.2d 230 (1957).
249 See Rieck Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 69 Dauph. Co. Rep. 345 (C.P.
1956). This case involved a dairy appeal from a commission order increasing the
spread between the subdealers' buying and selling prices. The dairy's arguments on
the standing issue were that the prices it must charge the subdealers were too high,
that the subdealers' profit margins were too low and that if they were not increased
the subdealers might discontinue business. A consequent loss of sales by the dairy,
it was contended, might result. The court held that the dairy was not an aggrieved
person.
2 50
MILX CONTROL LAw § 700j-906. The determination of the court is the same
whether the appeal is from a general order, MILK CONTROL LAw § 700j-901, or from
a special order, MILK CONTROL LAw § 700j-902.
251 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-906.
252 See, e.g., Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 70 Pa. D. & C.
223 (C.P. 1949); Local Union No. 205 v. Milk Control Comm'n, 55 Dauph. Co. Rep.
254 (C.P. 1944). Compare the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code, which states that
"the order of the [public utility] commission shall not be vacated or set aside, either
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of the standard may vary, however, depending upon whether the order is
promulgated as an original ruling or a revision, or whether it merely continues in effect an existing order.
In Meadow Gold Dairies,Inc. v. Milk Control Commn,

53

the agency,

after public hearing, issued an order reducing the resale prices of skim
milk, buttermilk, and cream. No evidence was presented at the hearing
concerning the existing prices of these items. The court held that, in order
to set a valid price or validly change an existing price, the Commission
must hold a hearing at which sufficient competent evidence is introduced to
enable the agency to make findings of fact justifying the pricing order.
Tested by such a standard, the reduction was found to be invalid. A
similar rule was expressed in Local Union No. 205 v. Milk Control
ComrWn.. 1 There, the appeal attacked the validity of an order establishing an optional differential to retail stores one-half cent below the price of
milk delivered to the door. The milk dealers argued that the promulgation
of the differential was based on incompetent evidence, consisting for the
most part of general opinions that there "should" be a store differential.
The court held that the order was not supported by competent and substantial evidence and that therefore it failed to meet the requisites of section 700j-801.255 Although producer and dealer cost evidence was introduced, "the Record is bare of specific testimony relating to the probable
effect of the establishing of a retail price differential, upon the retail store
dealer .

.

. or its effect upon those consumers of milk receiving home

delivery. Further, there was no evidence relating to the percentage of those
consumers who buy on a cash-and-carry basis, and those receiving home
delivery." 2 56 The court thought it especially important in this case that
the Commission gather evidence of this nature, for only five years before
the agency had eliminated a similar price differential on the ground that
2
it contributed to chaotic conditions in the industry.

57

While a considerable volume of evidence is submitted at the agency's
hearings, the Commission may properly reject portions of it so long as
in whole or in part, except for error of law or lack of evidence to support the finding,
determination or order of the commission . . . ." PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 66, § 1437
(1959). The superior court 'has interpreted this language as specifying the substantial evidence standard for reviewing agency rate determinations. Duquesne Light
Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 174 Pa. Super. 62, 99 A2d 61 (1953),
modified, 176 Pa. Super. 568, 107 A.2d 745 (1954) ; cf. Reading Co. v. Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 188 Pa. Super. 146, 146 A.2d 746 (1958). Compare Philadelphia
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Coxnm'n, 173 Pa. Super. 38, 95 A.2d 244 (1953). The
federal statute providing for natural gas rate regulation by the Federal Power Commission specifically incorporates a substantial evidence test. Act of June 21, 1938,
52 Stat. 831, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1958); see FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). See also Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e) (5),
60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)(5) (1958).
253 70 Pa. D. & C. 223 (C.P. 1949).
254 55 Dauph. Co. Rep. 254 (C.P. 1944).
255 MIr.i CONTROL LAw § 7001-801, set out in text at note 186 supra.
256 Local Union No. 205 v. Milk Control Comm'n, 55 Dauph. Co. Rep. 254, 265
(C.P.2571944).
Id. at 265-66.
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there remains a core upon which a responsible determination can be based.
In reviewing an agency change in the minimum prices which dealers were
to charge to subdealers, the court stated that "the Milk Control Commission
is not required to take a cross section of a particular type of dealer whose
operation might be inefficient, or whose operation might result in too
many 'middlemen' receiving profits before the milk gets into the hands of
the public." 258 Even though the order in question set prices slightly lower
than those indicated by the total survey figures (the Commission probably
excluded a number of subdealers' cost data), this action did not amount to
an abuse of discretion.259

A different situation exists when the agency's decision is not an initial
promulgation or change of a pricing order, but a continuation of an existing
order. In this instance, the Commission has wider latitude in rejecting
evidence 260 and its decision to retain the present price may be justified by
evidence previously given at the initial hearing on this price.261 Thus,
wholesale purchasers have been consistently thwarted in their efforts to
secure a revised order reflecting allegedly changed conditions. Their
burden of proof is similar to that in utility rate cases, in which one who
attacks an existing rate has the burden of showing by positive and clear
proof the necessity for change.262 In Milk Control Comm'n v. United
Retail Grocers Ass'n, 6 3 the retailers sought an increase in the permissible
grocery store markup in the Scranton area and presented the testimony of
three witnesses as to operating costs. The milk commission rejected the
testimony as insufficient to require a change in the spread already in effect;
the evidence was found to be fragmentary, speculative, and indefinite. The
lower court invalidated the agency disposition,26 holding that since the
cost testimony was disregarded and since there was no independent survey
conducted, the Commission had no evidence on which to ground its
essentially negative determination.2 6 5 This decision was reversed by the
supreme court 2 6 on the grounds that nothing in section 700j-801 compels
25

SReick Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 69 Dauph. Co. Rep. 345, 350

(C.P. 1956).
259 Id. at 352.

260
See Milk Control Comm'n v. United Retail Grocers Ass'n, 361 Pa. 221, 64
A.2d 818 (1949); Food Distribs. Ass'n v. Milk Control Comm'n, 60 Dauph. Co.
Rep. 183 (C.P. 1949).
261 See MnIK CONTROL LAW § 700j-801: "All provisions of all price-fixing orders
of the commission shall be presumed to be valid, and the burden of proving any
invalidity of any provisions thereof shall be upon the person asserting the same."
262
See Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 141 Pa. Super. 5, 14
A.2d 133 (1940); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Public Util. Com'n, 135 Pa. Super. 20,
4 A.2d 628 (1939); Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co. v. Public Serv. Comn'n,
122 Pa. Super. 252, 186 Atl. 318 (1936).
263 361 Pa. 221, 64 A.2d 818 (1949), reversing 59 Dauph. Co. Rep. 275 (C.P.
1948).
264 United Retail Grocers Assn v. Milk Control Conm'n, 59 Dauph. Co. Rep 275

(1948).
265

Id. at 278.

266

Milk Control Comm'n v. United Retail Grocers Ass'n, 361 Pa. 221, 64 A.2d

818 (1949).
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the milk board to conduct a survey if the evidence before it is insufficientparticularly where the proceeding is not one involving an original order
but one in which the revision of an existing order is in issue.2 6 7 Previous
orders, said the court, should be assumed to be fair in the absence of proof
of changed economic conditions; the burden, therefore, was upon the
grocers to show facts sufficient to require a price alteration. Absent such
a rule, any interested party could reopen a pricing order at any time and
force the Commission to justify its position de novo. 26 And although
complete agency surveys at frequent intervals might be theoretically desirable, the heavy expense and the time wasted on petitions dedicated only
to self-interest render such a plan unfeasible.
A similar problem was presented when the Food Distributors Association requested a three-quarter-cent reduction in the existing wholesale price
with no change in the retail price; 269 in effect, the requested change would
have increased the retail markup from a flat two cents to two and threequarters cents. Clearly, either the milk dealers or the producers would have
had to bear the effect of the proposed reduction; the retail stores, however,
made no specific representation that it was to be deducted from producers'
or dealers' prices. Both groups intervened and offered evidence of their
own increased costs and of the effect of profit diminution on dairy herd
population and area milk supply. The commission order retaining the
existing price was sustained on appeal on the ground that the retailers
had failed to carry their burden of proof. Essential to their case was not
only a showing of the necessity for a reduction in minimum wholesale
prices but also proof of the ability of others in the industry to absorb the
2 70

increased spread.

3. Difficulties Attributable to Evidentiary Rules
The two cases discussed above 27 1 illustrate the difficulty facing retail
stores attempting to realize a price change, whether the change be needed
for the welfare of the industry or desired on self-serving grounds. How are
retailers, who bear the burden of proof, to obtain from dairies and farmers
the cost data and other material necessary for proof that a decrease in
profits could be absorbed at the secondary and primary levels of distribution? The task is clearly impossible without cooperation, and cooperation
is unlikely when the results desired are considered. A major objection to
the Commission's stringent rule is that economic conditions may move well
267

361 Pa. at 225, b4 A.2d at 820.

268

361 Pa. at 226, 64 A.2d at 820.

269

Food Distribs. Ass'n v. Milk Control Comm'n, 60 Dauph. Co. Rep. 183

(C.P.
1949).
2
7o id. at 190. The court stated that "the appellants . . . were obliged on the
whole record to show that other parts of the industry could absorb the desired
increased spread."
271 Milk Control Comm'n v. United Retail Grocers Ass'n, 361 Pa. 221, 64 A.2d
818 (1949); Food Distribs. Ass'n v. Milk Control Comm'n, 60 Dauph. Co. Rep.
183 (C.P. 1949).
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beyond the point at which a change is necessary before action is taken.
One suggestion would be to place the initial burden on the proponents of
change to demonstrate conclusively that price alteration is necessary from
their point of view. Upon such a showing, other persons who would be
adversely affected by the proposed change could come forward with
evidence of their inability to operate under a decreased profit situation.
This change in the rules of evidence would increase the responsiveness of
the pricing mechanism and provide a more realistic allocation of the
burden in price change proceedings, without encouraging a constant flood
of self-serving petitions.
V. ENFORCEMENT

A. Selling Below the Minimum Price
1. What Is a Violation?
Section 700j-807 272 of the Milk Control Law leaves few roads
open 273 for the producer, dealer, or handler seeking to engage in milk
transactions below the fixed minimum price. Variations in the mechanics
of the transfer make no difference: sales, consignments, 274 and other means
of making available or handling milk are covered. 275 Nor is any distinction
drawn between the two sides of the bargain-both parties violate the act
272 MILC CONTROL LAW § 700j-807: "After the commission shall have fixed prices
to be charged or paid for milk, whether by class, grade, use or otherwise, it shall be
unlawful for a milk dealer or handler or producer, knowingly or unknowingly, or
any other person knowingly, by himself or through another, to sell or deliver, or make
available on consignment or otherwise, or buy or receive, or handle on consignment
or otherwise, or offer to [do any of the above] . . . or advertise for sale, delivery,
purchase or receipt, or hold one's self out as willing to sell, deliver, buy or receive
milk at any price below the minimum price . . . ." A later part of the section
prevents sales, etc. of milk "at a price computed upon false or erroneous weight,
butterfat test, grade or classification; or at a price from which have been made
deductions not authorized by law or in excess of any deductions so authorized,
whether such illegal deductions be in the form of excessive transportation charges
or otherwise."
273 A dealer may buy from an out-of-state producer or an out-of-state dairy at
a bargained price. See notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text. Despite the
holding in Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939), see
notes 108-12 supra and accompanying text, the milk commission does not regulate
the price of milk purchased in Pennsylvania for shipment in interstate commerce.
This allows in-state purchases, at freely negotiated prices, shipment to an out-of-state
bottling plant, and subsequent sales to retailers at freely negotiated prices. Interview
With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960.
2 74
In Green v. Milk Control Comm'n, 340 Pa. 1, 16 A.2d 9 (1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 708 (1941), a dealer entered into contracts with farmers in which he designated himself as a factor and referred to the milk he received as merely "consigned"
to him, with title remaining in the producers. The court held that since the act
mentioned only purchases and sales, it was inapplicable to consignments. This case
was repudiated by the legislature in 1941, when § 700j-807 was amended to cover
consignment transactions. See MILx CONTROL LAW § 700j-807.
275 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-807.
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The section also

No method or device shall be lawful whereby [milk is transferred for]
a price less than the minimum price applicable to the particular transaction, whether by any discount, premium, rebate, free
service, trading stamps, advertising allowance, or extension of credit,
or by a combined price for such milk, together with another commodity
or a service which is less, or is represented to be less, than the aggregate of the price of the milk and the price or value of such commodity
277
or service ....

Whether this list of devices is exhaustive or illustrative presents a close
question of statutory construction, 27 8 but the answer is of little consequence
in enforcing the section., Even if it be deemed exhaustive, many of the
individual items are sufficiently broad 2 79 to cover virtually all price avoidance techniques. In applying the section, the courts have demonstrated a
0
willingness to give effect to the evident pervasiveness of the language.2
-Aside from specific statutory violations, such as issuance of trading

stamps 28 1 and granting of advertising allowances, 28 2 the following devices
have been held illegal: a dairy's practice of furnishing porch boxes to its
home consumers free of charge; 283 a contest conducted by a dealer selling
through grocers in which every prize won by a consumer resulted in a
276 Ibid. The section has an additional paragraph concerning the dealer-transferee: "It shall be unlawful for any milk dealer or handler to store, manufacture,
process, sell or handle or deliver or make available on consignment or otherwise, any
milk for which he has paid, or agreed to pay, a price lower than that fixed by the
commission for milk of that class or grade."
2 77

2 78

MILK CONTROL LAw

§ 700j-807.

The "whether by . . . or . . ." clause, containing no catchall language,
militates toward the exclusive interpretation; the strong language at the beginning
of the paragraph-"no method or device"--can be made the basis for an argument
that the listing is illustrative only.
Compare "trading stamps,
279 E.g., "discount, premium, rebate, free service."
advertising allowance."
280 "The methods and devices whereby milk can be sold at a price less than the
minimum fixed by the commission are as unlimited as the genius of man ....
Milk control is founded upon price control. As soon as dealers find a method or
device to break down the commission's control over the price actually being paid,
milk control will become chaotic, and soon non-existent. The legislature understood
this. It is evident from reading Section 807 of the Milk Control Law . . . that it
attempted, by every conceivable means, to close every 'loop hole! which would enable
one dealer to obtain a price advantage over another." Milk Control Comm'n v.
Reick Dairy Div., 193 Pa. Super. 32, 37, 163 A.2d 891, 894 (1960).
281 Food Fair, Inc., A. & I. No. V-216 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Dec. 10,
1957); Acme Market, A. & I. No. V-210 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Oct. 7, 1957).
Compare Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939) (issuance
of trading stamps not a violation of Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act).
282 Milk Control Comm'n v. Reick Dairy Div., 193 Pa. Super. 32, 163 A.2d 891
(1960).
283 Martin Century Farms, A. & I. No. A-36 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n June 21,

1960).
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duplicate prize for the grocer; 284 and the sale to merchants at the minimum
price, followed by a repayment of ten per cent of the price to a merchantowned corporation as compensation for soliciting, investigating credit
ratings, collecting bills, servicing accounts, advertising, and the use of the
corporation brand name-similar services were rendered to other suppliers
285
at little or no charge.
The comprehensiveness of the act's prohibitions is illustrated by Penn
Cress Ice Cream Co. v. Stites.285 There, the dealer was awarded a contract
to supply milk to a sanatorium at the minimum price established by a commission order. The order was silent on whether the addition of vitamin D
to the milk affected the milk's price. The dealer included the vitamin at no
extra charge. The court, finding that the inclusion considerably increased
the dealer's costs, held that vitamin D was a commodity within the meaning
of section 700j-807, which prohibits the sale of milk together with any
other commodity for the price of the milk alone.2 8 7 Violation was also
found by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Milk Control Comm'n v.
McCallister Dairy Farms.2 88 In McCallister, defendant retailer sold milk
in gallon and half-gallon bottles upon which customers paid a five-cent
deposit that was refundable when the bottles were returned. However,
'defendant displayed a notice informing buyers that a short walk to a
nearby service station would be well worthwhile when it came time to
return the bottles: the service station was offering twenty-five cents for
the gallon jugs and twenty for the half-gallon containers. The court found
that the defendant and the service station were acting in concert and that
the deposit scheme resulted in a rebate prohibited by section 700j-807.289
In current use is the device of "loans" by dairies to wholesaler-buyers with
the understanding that they need not be repaid.2 90 This practice has not
been tested in the courts, but it would seem to be a clear violation of the
statute.
284

Dairymen's League Co-op., A. & I. No. W-193 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n

Sept. 17, 1959).
285 Shearer's Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 191 Pa. Super. 574, 159
A.2d 268 (1960).
28643 Pa. D. & C. 80 (C.P. 1941).
287 Id. at 84-85.
288 384 Pa. 459, 121 A.2d 144 (1956).
289 Id. at 462-64, 121 A.2d at 146. Although § 700j-807 was not involved, Grow v.
Milk Control Comm'n, 52 Pa. D. & C. 225 (C.P. 1944), held that a scheme used by
an operator in the dual position of milk dealer and milk producer which resulted in
underpayments to other producers was illegal.

Defendant attempted to segregate the

milk from his own herd and place it in a higher-paying utilization class while placing

the milk of other producers in a lower category. This had the effect of reducing the
blend price, see note 20 supra, to other producers below the payments which would

have been owing had all the milk been used in computing the blend price. The court
held that under the Commission's General Order B-1 the scheme was illegal; the
producer-dealer must treat all milk equally.
290 Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk
Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960; questionnaire distributed by the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June-August, 1960.
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2. Commission Action and Prohibited Conduct
Section 700j-807 is not the Commission's only statutory weapon
against devices designed to evade the agency's established minimum prices.
In at least two instances, the courts have failed to find violations of section
700j-807 in practices which might reasonably be considered the granting of
"premiums" or "free service." In each case, however, subsequent administrative action was capable of controlling the practices even though they
did not fall within the explicit statutory proscription. In 1950 the Milk
Control Commission issued a bulletin 291 warning that the giving of free
refrigeration equipment would be considered a method of selling below the
minimum price. Sylvan Seal Dairy continued to offer equipment to buyers
free of charge and was promptly cited by the agency for violating section
700j-404(10), which allows the Commission to invoke sanctions against a
licensee who "has violated any of the provisions of this act, or any of the
rules, regulations or orders of the commission .... ,,292 The court
found that the bulletin was not a "rule, regulation or order" within the
meaning of the subsection.293 Intent to undersell was considered a necessary element of a section 700j-807 violation by means of device, 294 and
here "the obvious purpose and effect of leasing the cabinet is to stimulate
the sale of milk and to influence grocers; by means other than by price
concessions, to become, or remain, customers of Sylvan Seal." 295 In
1956 the Commission followed the formal notice provisions of the statute 296
and issued rules of trade practices which forbid the giving of free refrigeration equipment and provide that a fair rental is to be charged for all such
equipment furnished.297 In Milk Maid Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Milk Control
CoMnm'n,29 8 the trade practice rules were upheld and the citation for their
violation was affirmed.
Similarly, on grounds that the issuance of free samples with sales was
a customary and sometimes permitted industry practice and that the
statute provided no notice that the practice was a violation, 299 the court
in Greenville Dairy Co. v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comn'n 300 found
no transgression of section 700j-807. However, the court indicated that
the practice might be controlled by administrative order, 30 and the agency
291

Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Bull. No. 248.
§ 700j-404(10).
Sylvan Seal Milk, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 74 Pa. D. & C. 289, 296

292 MILK CONTROL LAW
293

(C.P. 1951).

294 Id. at 298-99. But see Milk Control Comm'n v. Rieck Dairy Div., 193 Pa.
Super. 32, 163 A.2d 891 (1960).
295 74 Pa. D. & C. at 299.
296 The notice provisions of the statute are found in §§ 700j-307, -308, -309.
297 Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Rules of Trade Practices A-I, Dec. 12, 1956.
298 190 Pa. Super. 410, 154 A.2d 274 (1959).
299 It would seem that the word "premium" in the list of devices contained in
§ 700j-807 might cause a dairy some uneasiness.
300 68 Pa. D. & C. 597 (C.P. 1949).

301 Id.at 608.
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has since promulgated rules 3 02 regulating the type and amount of free
samples. Inasmuch as the increased dealer costs resulting from free
sampling are reflected in consumer prices, the milk commission has attempted to enforce these rules strictly. 303 But the effort cannot be termed
a success: in 1958 approximately $1,500,000 in free samples were given out
in the Philadelphia area alone.30 4
3. Specific Intent as an Element of the Offense
In Commonwealth v. Jackson,30 5 defendant was cited for violating the
Milk Control Act when his dairymaid sold milk to commission investigators
at a price below the minimum. Jackson contended that he had no knowledge of his servant's activity and sought to rely on the common-law rule
that one is not liable for the criminal acts of another in which the former
did not participate directly or indirectly. 30 6 Finding the common-law rule
unavailable in the case of a statutory violation, the court reasoned that if
a knowing violation were required, the legislature would have so speci307
fied.
Two months prior to the Jackson decision in the superior court, the
legislature did make its position clear-knowledge or intent was not an
essential element of a section 700j-807 violation.303 The amendment also
provided that "the act of a director, officer, agent or other person acting for
or employed by a milk dealer shall be deemed the act of such milk
dealer." 3 0 9 The Jackson court, in footnote, viewed this addition as mere
clarification of existing law.310 Although the holding of the case clearly
coincides with and is aided by this interpretation, in one important respect
the amendment spreads a broader net than did the unchanged statute as
construed in Jackson. There is dictum in the decision that "only a disregard by the servant of positive orders of the employer will relieve him
302

Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Bull. No. 277, issued by the Commission on

January 12, 1949, prohibited the distribution of any free samples. Subsequent regulations have allowed limited free sampling. E.g., Official General Order No. B-6,
§ I(a) provides: "A milk dealer or handler shall be limited to the distribution of
one free sample of any type of fluid milk and one free sample of any other milk
product to a prospective retail customer in any one six months' period."
303 Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., July 27, 1960.
304

Ibid.

305 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A.2d 299 (1941), aff'd per curian, 345 Pa. 456, 28

A.2d 894 (1942).
306 Id. at 331. See Commonwealth v. Johnston, 2 Pa. Super. 317 (1896).
307 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 333, 22 A.2d 299, 301-02 (1941),
aff'd per curiam, 345 Pa. 456, 28 A.2d 894 (1942) : "Other sections of the act, imposing other duties, e.g., §§ 401, 608, specifically provide that proof of guilty knowledge
or intent is essential to impose liability for failure to perform them. If it were the
intention of § 807 to relieve a proprietor except upon proof of his knowledge of sales,
below the price fixed by law, the legislature would have said so. The omission is
significant."
30
8 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-807. The phrase "knowingly or unknowingly"
was added.
309 Ibid.
310 146 Pa. Super. at 333 n.2, 22 A.2d at 302 n.2.
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from the penalty of § 807." 311 With regard to all those who are milk
dealers,3 12 this statement cannot stand in the face of the statutory directive
that acts of employees "shall be deemed" the acts of the dealer.8 13
The Pennsylvania appellate courts 314 and the milk commission 315
have carried out the legislative intent by holding that section 700j-807 may
be violated by sale or by device,3 16 despite an absence of specific intent on
the part of the actor. However, a few of the decisions at the county level
indicate dissatisfaction with the per se rule and tend to emphasize motive in
their reasoning. In one case, 317 defendant's practice of selling skim milk
back to his producers was considered by the Commission to be a device to
sell below the minimum price. The defendant had previously contacted the
agency on an informal basis concerning the practice, but evidently he did
not satisfy the Commission in complying with arrangements designed to
effectuate his plan legally. In finding the commission action unreasonable
under the circumstances presented, the court held that the practice was not
a "device" within the meaning of section 700j-807, noting a lack of "stealth
or hiding." 3 18 Since defendant's activity was done in good faith3 19 and
811 146 Pa. Super. at 333, 22 A.2d at 301.
812 For the broad statutory definition of "milk dealer or handler," see note 12
sup ra.
813 See Sealtest Food Prods., A. & I. No. W-143 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n
March 25, 1959) : "[W]ith largeness comes responsibility and if the defendant is so
large [that supervision of employees was impossible], it must be large enough to
maintain proper supervisory personnel so that violations will not take place in the
future." But see Carver's Dairy, A. & I. No. V-218 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n
Dec. 16, 1957), where the Commission stated that defendant was guilty because
there had been no showing that the unlawful acts were contrary to the company's
express orders. This case does not, of course, decide the issue squarely, and no
case has been found which does so. But if expressly ordering employees not to do a
prohibited act is a sufficient defense, as is hinted in the Carver case, the proscriptions
of § 700j-807 could be easily avoided.
314 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 345 Pa. 456, 28 A.2d 894 (1942), affirming per
curiam 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A.2d 299 (1941); Milk Control Comm'n v. Rieck
Dairy Div., 193 Pa. Super. 32, 37, 163 A.2d 891, 894 (1960): "The motive is not
important. It is the effect of the transaction which determines whether it constitutes
a method or device to sell milk at a price less than the minimums set by the commission. The effect of the transactions was to permit the income of some of the
dealer's large customers to be increased through payments made to them by the
dealer
3 for a purpose connected with the sale of the dealer's milk."
15 Lyken's Dairy, A. & I. No. W-167 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n May 13, 1959);
Abbott's Dairies, A. & I. No. W-147 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 30, 1959);
Sealtest Food Prods., A. & I. No. W-143 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 25,
1959); Shade's Dairy, A. & I. No. W-97 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Oct. 16, 1958).
316 Milk Control Comm'n v. Rieck Dairy Div., 193 Pa. Super. 32, 163 A.2d 891
(1960).
317 Milk Control Comm'n v. Nicoson, 57 Pa. D. & C. 166 (C.P. 1946).
318 Id. at 177. The court in Greenville Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Comn'n, 68
Pa. D. & C. 597, 606 (C.P. 1949), did not find it necessary to evade the issue; it
clearly indicated that intent was important with regard to devices: "However, if
the act in itself is not unlawful but becomes so only when it is a part of a scheme, or
device, or method to evade the law or other lawful order, then the intention and
purpose of the actor might become vitally material."
319 Although it was held that there had been no sale or offer to sell below the
minimum price in Country Belle v. Milk Control Comm'n, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 420
(C.P. 1959), and although it was there admitted that knowledge is immaterial, id. at
424, it appears that the court was aided in reaching the result by the fact that there was
"not a scintilla of evidence of bad faith or of fraud" and that "it is beyond the
"
bounds of reason to subject one to a penalty for following in good faith ...
Id. at 425, 426.
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before the eyes of the agency, he had employed no device and was therefore
320
not guilty.
Likewise, in Milk Control Comm'n v. Parris,321 the exemption contained in section 700j-802 was utilized to protect a vending machine
operator selling milk from his machines in manufacturing establishments
at less than the minimum price. The section states, inter alia, that the Commission may fix prices of sales from stores to consumers "except for consumption at the store where sold. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to empower the commission to fix the price at which milk may be
sold by any milk dealer or handler . . . to consumers for consumption
")322
on the premises of such milk dealer or handler or producer ....
The court found no violation since defendant was operating a "store" for
the sale of milk to be consumed on the premises.32 3 There is considerable
strain involved in reconciling a vending machine with the statutory definition of " store," 324 and in agreeing that drinking defendant's milk in the
locale of the vending equipment in another's plant is synonymous with

"consumption on the premises of such milk . . . handler ..

325

As it stands, it is apparent that the case protects not only unknowing
deviation but also deliberate underselling by such a vendor.
B. Sanctions
1. Availability and Use
Although the Milk Control Law contains sections prescribing penalties3
320

2

6

and injunctive remedies 3 2

7

available to the agency and interested

Milk Control Comm'n v. Nicoson, 57 Pa. D. & C. 166 (C.P. 1946).

The

lower court in the Rieck case, reversed at 193 Pa. Super. 32, 163 A.2d 891, used a
similar approach. In the words of the superior court, "it concluded that [advertising
allowances] . . . did not constitute a method or device to sell milk at a price less
than the minimum established by law . . . . The legislature, the court concluded,
did not make all advertising allowances illegal, and the burden was upon the commission to show that the motive of the milk dealer in giving these advertising allowances was other than to carry out an honest and legitimate advertising program."
193 Pa. Super. at 36-37, 163 A.2d at 894.
82163
Pa. D. & C. 674 (C.P. 1949).
322
MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-802.
323 Milk Control Comm'n v. Parris, 63 Pa. D. & C. 674, 677 (C.P. 1949).
324 MILK CONTROL LAW

§ 700j-103: "'Store! includes a grocery store, hotel,

restaurant, soda fountain, dairy products store, or any similar mercantile establishment which sells or distributes milk."
325 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-802.
328 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-1001 deals with first and second offenses and
provides for a fine of $25.00 minimum and $300.00 maximum. If the fine is not paid,
the violator may be imprisoned for not less than five nor more than thirty days. No
offense which took place more than five years before the violation being considered
may be considered in determining whether the violator is a first or second offender.
Section 700j-1002 provides that for a third or subsequent offense, within a five-year
period, the violator shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined $500 to $1,000,
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
327 MLKX CONTROL LAW

§ 700j-1003 provides that actions to enforce compliance

may be instituted by "the commission or any person, marketing committee, union or
association, composed of persons affected by the orders, rules or regulations of the
commission . . . ." MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-1004 empowers the Commission to
obtain mandatory and prohibitive injunctive relief. (The venue provisions of this
section are now controlled by PA. R. Civ. P. 1503.)
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groups upon violation of the act (or rules, regulations, or orders made
under it), the current commission approach in nearly every pricing case
is to apply instead the sanctions of section 700j-404.32
That section
empowers the Commission to revoke or suspend the license of a milk dealer
or handler or to halt the milk operations of an exempted dealer.
The extreme sanction of revocation is rarely used by the Commission;
it is considered far too severe for the ordinary case and is reserved for
those instances in which other methods of correction prove fruitless. 2 9
While the Commission has on occasion employed lengthy suspensions as
an alternative, even these lesser sanctions have been considered too drastic
by the courts in several cases. A six-month suspension of a dairy for a
$1,000 underpayment to farmers was held unreasonable in view of the
competitive nature of the business. 33° It was thought that other dealers
would take away defendant's customers during the suspension period, with
the result that defendant would be forced out of business. The court,
upon condition that the $1,000 deficit be paid, shortened the suspension to
five days, effective in ninety days, and stipulated that it could be further
reduced by "good behavior" during the ninety-day period. And in Greenville Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Comm'n,3 3 1 a fifteen-day suspension, to
332
begin five days after notice, was found harsh and unreasonable.
Evidently the Commission has similar fears concerning the harshness
of the suspension sanction. In 1957 the agency was successful in persuading the legislature 333 to enact section 700j-404.1, whereby the Commission
might accept fifty dollars for each day of suspension in lieu of the dealer
or handler's temporarily halting operations. 33 4 The Commission today
issues comparatively short suspensions and invariably offers the option of
paying the alternate monetary penalty.33

5

In the case of constant violators,

328 MILK CONTROL LAW § 700j-404: "The commission may . . . suspend, revoke
or refuse to transfer a license already granted to a milk dealer or handler, or may
prohibit a milk dealer or handler exempted from the license requirements of this act
from continuing to operate as a milk dealer or handler ....
"
329 Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control

Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., June 22, 1960; SPENCER & CHRISTENSEN, MILK
CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE NORTHEASTERN STATES pt. 2, at 58-59 (Cornell University
Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. 918, 1955).
330 Wolfe v. Milk Control Comm'n, 40 Pa. D. & C. 687 (C.P. 1940).
33168 Pa. D. & C. 597 (C.P. 1949).
32
3
Id. at 610.
333 Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Harrisburg, Pa., June 22, 1960.
334 MILI CONTROL LAW § 700j-404.1: "In any case where the commission shall

suspend a license, the commission may accept from the licensee an offer in compromise at the rate of fifty dollars ($50) for each day of suspension as a penalty in
lieu of such suspension, and thereupon rescind the suspension."

335 E.g., Lyken's Dairy, A. & 1. No. W-167 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n May 13,
1959) (two-day suspension or optional $100.00 payment); Abbott's Dairies, A. & I.
No. W-147 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 30, 1959) (three-day suspension or
optional $150.00 payment; previous violations) ; Sealtest Food Prods., A. & I. No.

W-143 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 25, 1959) (fifteen-day suspension or
optional $750.00 payment; previous violations); Shade's Dairy, A. & I. No. W-97

(Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Oct. 16, 1958)

(six-day suspension or optional $300.00

payment; previous violations); Carver's Dairy, A. & I. No. V-218 (Pa. Milk Control
Comm'n Dec. 16, 1957) (three-day suspension or optional $150.00 payment).
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the obvious effect of this practice is to license them to do business illegally.336 Enforcement is further weakened by a wide range of circumstances which mitigate the sanction or even lead to dismissal of the case.
Among the circumstances which have resulted in such lighter penalties or
dismissal are that: (1) the violation resulted from the defendant's negligent supervision of his dairy while he was running for elective office; 337
(2) the violation consisted of underselling to maintain a "competitive"
position in the face of secret discounts given by other dealers; 338 (3) the
violator made a firm promise "never to do it again" ; 33 9 (4) the defendant
had no previous violations; 340 (5) the violation was attributable to the
"matter of public relations" involved in deducting a "donation" from a
bill for milk sold to the local fire company which operated a stand at an
annual fair; 341 (6) the violation resulted from a mechanical defect in a
vending machine; 342 (7) the dealer had instituted better methods of supervising drivers in giving out free samples; 343 (8) the offending driver was
3 36

In Harbison's Dairy, A. & I. No. W-146 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 3,
1959), defendant was found guilty of giving excessive samples and suspended ten days
with an option to pay the $500.00 penalty. Defendant was cited and found guilty
of the same offense on July 22, 1957, and Sept. 8, 1958, the optional payments in
each case being set at $300.00 and $500.00, respectively. The Commission did not
increase the penalty for the 1959 offense because it was felt that the dairy was trying
to correct its illegal operations. Sealtest Food Prods., A. & I. No. W-143 (Pa.
Milk Control Comm'n March 25, 1959), also involved a conviction for excessive
sampling. The sanction was fifteen days suspension or the optional $750.00 payment.
Defendant had previously been cited July 29, 1957, and July 16, 1958. The fines
were merely increased on each occasion-from $300.00 in 1957, to $500.00 in 1958,
to $750.00 in 1959.
337
Zimmerman's Dairy, A. & I. No. W-194 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Sept. 17,
1959) (violation charged was giving free equipment; two-day suspension or optional
$100.00 payment).
33 8
Engle Farm Dairies, A. & I. No. A-13 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 2,
1960) (underselling minimum; one-day suspension or optional $50.00 payment);
Brookfield Dairy, A. & I. No. W-185 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n July 10, 1959)
(underselling minimum; five-day suspension or optional $250.00 payment) ; Hill Crest
Farms, A. & I. No. W-139 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 2, 1959) (giving
excessive samples; previous violations; six-day suspension or optional $300.00 payment); Williamsport East End Dairy, A. & I. No. W-68 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n
Sept. 22, 1958) (underselling minimum; no previous violations; four-day suspension
or optional $200.00 payment).
339 Furman, A. & I. No. V-213 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Aug. 10, 1957)
(failure to file monthly report; case dismissed).
340 See, e.g., Turner & Westcott, Inc., A. & I. No. W-80 (Pa. Milk Control
Comm'n Sept. 11, 1958) (giving excessive samples; one-day suspension or optional
$50.00 payment); Wengert's Dairy, Inc., A. & I. No. V-221 (Pa. Milk Control
Comm'n Jan. 6, 1958) (selling equipment to customer without filing contract of sale
with Commission; two-day suspension or optional $100.00 payment).
34
1Behren Bros. Bear Creek Dairy, A. & I. No. W-118 (Pa. Milk Control
Comm'n Oct. 28, 1958) (underselling minimum; case dismissed).
342Leonard Dairy, A. & I. No. W-119 (Pa. Milk Control Comnim'n Oct. 28,
1958) (underselling minimum; case dismissed).
343 Harbison's Dairy, A. & I. No. W-146 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 3,
1959) (giving excessive samples; several previous violations; ten-day suspension or
optional $500.00 payment); The Borden Co., A. & I. No. W-48 (Pa. Milk Control
Comm'n Sept. 8, 1958) (giving excessive samples; six-day suspension or optional
$300.00 payment).
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instructed before the Commission "not to do it again"; 344 (9) the defendant
showed that all dealings with the customer to whom rebates were given
had been discontinued; 4 5 (10) the violation resulted from error or
accident; 341 (11) the violation was attributable to dealer misunderstanding
of an agency order; 347 and (12) the violation resulted from an attempt to
prevent customer hardship. 348 Although certain of these considerations
may justify mitigation, 349 the list on the whole leaves the impression that
the Commission is overly lenient with those who transgress the Milk
Control Law.
2. Effectiveness
The difficulty which the Commission experiences in policing the milk
industry may be partially explained by the pervasiveness of the violation
section of the statute-so much is illegal. But the nature of the action
prohibited makes the job even more arduous. In an economy where competition is the usual rule, the legislature has attempted to insulate the milk
industry from many forms of competitive enterprise. It is not surprising,
therefore, that violations are rampant. Naturally, this persisting illegality
is not solely the product of inability to shed normal business traits; there
are obvious economic benefits to be gained by evasion of the statutory
34 4 Spojnia Farm Dairy, A. & I. No. W-95 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Sept. 2,
1958) (underselling minimum; case dismissed).
345 Frankford Dairies, Inc., A. & I. No. A-6 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n April 30,
1960) (underselling minimum; one-day suspension or optional $50.00 payment).
346 Foremost Dairies, A. & I. No. W-144 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n April 16,
1959) (giving excessive samples; previous violation; one-day suspension or optional
$50.00 payment); Schneider's Dairy, A. & I. No. W-165 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n
April 8, 1959) (giving excessive samples; one-day suspension or optional $50.00
payment). But laziness on the part of an employee appears to be no excuse. See
Otto's Suburban Dairy, Inc., A. & I. No. W-54 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Oct. 1,
1958), where defendant's employee sold two quarts of milk at the half-gallon price
rather than returning to the plant to obtain the half-gallon container. The dairy was
cited for underselling the minimum price and received a one-day suspension or
optional $50.00 payment.
347 See Brookfield Dairy, A. & I. No. A-7 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n March 2,
1960) (giving excessive samples; one-day suspension or optional $50.00 payment);
Meadow Gold Dairy, A. & I. No. W-217 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Dec. 18, 1959)
(giving excessive samples; six-day suspension or optional $300.00 payment). But see
Willow Ridge Farm, A. & I. No. V-219 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Dec. 16, 1957),
where defendant viewed chocolate milk as a "milk product" as distinguished from
"fluid milk" within the meaning of the Commission's order limiting the dealer to the
"distribution of one free sample of any type of fluid milk and one free sample of any
other milk product . . . ." The Commission disagreed. Defendant received a twoday suspension or optional $100.00 payment. Note also that where defendant's attorney
incorrectly interprets an order and misadvises his client as to permissible practices,
this does not constitute an excuse. Harmony Dairy Co., A. & I. No. W-179 (Pa.
Milk Control Comm'n Sept. 17, 1959) (giving excessive samples; ten-day suspension
or optional $500.00 payment).
348
Levengood Dairies, A. & I. No. W-42 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Sept. 15,
1958). The violation charged was delivering more than once within a forty-eight
hour period; the "hardship" pleaded was that the retail customer needed a large
supply of milk daily and her refrigerator was of limited capacity. The case was
dismissed.
349 E.g., the defective vending machine. See note 342 mipra and accompanying
text.
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commands. These illegal practices reduce the regulatory scheme to a
meaningless fiction which benefits some at the expense of others. If the
middleman is to engage in prohibited price-cutting operations, his gross
receipts must be high enough to enable him to give discounts and still be
assured of a profit. Thus, by paying the prices set by the Commission,
some buyers are subsidizing the distributors and making it possible for the
latter to afford the "deals" given to the larger, more desirable accounts.
The consumer rarely benefits from this procedure. Before the reduction
can filter to his level, a further violation-reselling below the retail minimum-must be committed. And the insignificant volume purchased by a
single consumer and his great need of the product make price cutting at
the retail level an unattractive and unnecessary step. In such a context,
it is obvious that the demand for more rigid enforcement by the Commission is commensurate with the difficulties inherent in controlling this type
of lawlessness.
It may be that the overall picture of repeated violations combined with
enforcement which cannot be termed vigorous merely reflects public dissatisfaction with the law. Perhaps the unwanted aspects of the statute-if
such there be-should be eliminated. But these are problems to be answered by the legislative judgment. Meanwhile, the law remains on the
statute books and, if the Commission is to carry out the standing legislative
mandate, penalties should be stiffened in an attempt to effect compliance
with minimum prices, rather than doling out periodic fines whose payment
entitles the violator to another span of business as usual. Only then will
350
the price controls operate effectively.
One further use of sanctions by the Commission deserves mention.
In addition to the mitigating factors previously discussed, the agency also
considers the defendant's failure to contest the citation. 51 Standing alone,
this factor has the desirable attributes of conserving the time and effort of
the Commission by encouraging admissions by the guilty. But the Commission has, at least once in the past, provided for an increased penalty if
an appeal were taken from its decision.3 52 Such a policy has no place in
our judicial or administrative system. 5 3 The resulting discouragement of
350"Milk control is founded upon price control. As soon as dealers find a
method or device to break down the commission's control over the price actually
being paid, milk control will become chaotic, and soon non-existent." Milk Control
Comm'n
v. Rieck Dairy Div., 193 Pa. Super. 32, 37, 163 A.2d 891, 894 (1960).
3
51 Harrisburg Dairies, Inc., A. & I. No. A-16 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n
April 12, 1960) (giving excessive samples; three-day suspension or optional $150.00
payment); Conewago Dairy, A. & I. No. W-122 (Pa. Milk Control Comm'n Dec. 18,
1958) (underselling minimum; one-day suspension or optional $50.00 payment).
352 Greenville Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 68 Pa. D. & C. 597, 608-09
(C.P. 1949). After meting out a ten-day suspension, to be effective in thirteen days,
the Commission's order stated: "That if this Order be appealed from and a supersedeas granted, should said appeal be dismissed or otherwise terminated favorable to
the Commission, any license issued for any period subsequent to April 30, 1949 shall
be automatically suspended five days after the termination of the appeal for a period
of fifteen (15) days."
353 Such an order hardly seems reconcilable with the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
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potentially valid defenses is intensified when such a rule is combined with
one which invites initial no-contest pleas. Any recurrence of the Greenville Dairy technique-the imposition of an additional five days' suspension
if an appeal be taken-has not been discovered.3 54 With the elimination of
this improper sanction, the Commission should now channel its energy in
the direction of deterring those who do persistently violate the law.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although enforcement of the Commission's minimum prices has been
intensified in recent years, 3 55 noncompliance is still a major problem. The
inability to reach a larger number of violators than is presently the case
may be traced to the fact that the Commission's enforcement arm is understaffed. 356 With an increased number of investigators, policing could be
stepped up, and control-now virtually nonexistent 357-of the buyers who
accept "deals" from the dairies could be undertaken.3 58 But apart from
widening the scope of enforcement, the Commission should increase the
59
severity of its penalties if price controls are to be at all meaningful.
These are the teeth in the law, but they are dulled by the easily met alternative of relatively mild monetary payments. If the sanctions of suspension
and revocation were utilized, the industry would quickly realize that violation is no longer profitable. While a strictly enforced, firm control over
prices and related forms of competition might not be as desirable as an
unregulated or less regulated milk economy, it certainly makes more sense
than going through the motions of fixing a minimum price which is ignored
with regularity.
354 All

commission cases since Greenville Dairy were examined.
No appreciable amount of enforcement was undertaken until approximately
five years ago. Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960; Interview With
former attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
355

July 8, 1960. This is also evident upon review of the citation hearings on file with
the Commission in Harrisburg.

356 Interview With Joab K. Mahood, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., June 22, 1960.
357 Interview With former attorney for the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 8, 1960. This view is substantiated upon examination of cases and citations concerning violations; in the vast majority of proceedings,
buyers are noticeably absent as defendants.
358 Several wholesale consumers state that the act is "making thieves of honest
men." Interviews With Wholesale Consumers at the 1960 Convention of the Pennsylvania Restaurant Owners' Association, in Galen Hall Mountain Resort, Pa.,
June 28-29, 1960. Those who do not have arrangements with distributors feel that
they are subsidizing the deals given to others.
359 Some dairies are candid about the situation and admit that violations are
numerous. Interview With attorney for a Philadelphia Dairy, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
July 7, 1960. Although some voiced the opinion that violations are at a minimum,
with only slight amounts of illegal activity throughout the state, e.g., Interview With
Attorneys Representing Several Philadelphia Dairies, July 27, 1960, a commission
attorney states that illegality is rampant and that a new evasive device appears as
soon as another is halted. Interview With Marvin D. Weintraub, Attorney for the
Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 1960.
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At present, because of widespread disregard of the law and certain
inherent limitations of the system itself, the benefits of price fixing appear
to be channeled in directions not contemplated by the legislature-perhaps
to the detriment of the farmers and consumers, the very groups for whose
protection the law was enacted. Some dairies, by purchasing at out-ofstate competitive prices and selling at high in-state fixed prices, have been
able to maintain profit margins higher than those forecasted by the Commission. Thus dairies doing business only within the borders of Pennsylvania are placed at a competitive disadvantage. The farmer in turn is
prejudiced by the loss of business to foreign producers; but he is forbidden
to attempt to meet this competition by matching the lower prices. These
high dealer margins, coupled with the enforcement lag, make under-theminimum sales to large wholesale buyers a profitable venture. And the
beneficiaries of these underselling schemes are naturally able to reap larger
profits upon resale than can their less fortunate competitors.
All of these "deals" and schemes to evade the Commission's minimum
prices would not be worthwhile, however, if the parties were not certain
of the price to be obtained upon the ultimate sale to the milk drinker. Thus
the consumer, who stands last in the distributive line and pays the high
minimum price, in effect subsidizes the illegal activity accompanying his
milk through the channels of distribution.
R.S.L.

